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This study starts with an observation: human rights and humanitarianism are often 
conflated into one and the same thing, even by scholars of these respective fields. A 
muddled use of terminology makes this lack of clarity evident; as such, the importance 
and power of language and discourse lies at the centre of this project. This thesis is set 
out to explore intersections and map convergences of human rights and 
humanitarianism—as discourses, as practices, and as related bodies of law (International 
Human Rights Law (IHRL) and Humanitarian Law (IHL)). In doing so, it seeks to draw 
attention to the beneficial potential of an interaction that can –at times– be synergetic, but 
also to the tensions it creates, when, far from mutually strengthening, human rights and 
humanitarianism work in contradiction. First, this thesis analyses the rapprochement 
between IHL and IHRL. This initial focus on the legal frameworks sets the ground for the 
subsequent study of converging discourses and practices, but it is also intrinsically 
valuable, laying bare some of the tensions around the jurisdictions, scopes of application, 
and protections afforded by these bodies of law. Second, focusing on four big player – 
two on the human rights side (Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch), and two 
on the humanitarian side (the International Committee of the Red Cross and Médecins 
Sans Frontières), this thesis turns to analysing dominant discourses. Noting the increased 
overlap in scopes of activities, and thus in discourse, it studies the impacts of the 
humanitarian-isation of human rights reporting, as well as of the human rights-isation of 
humanitarian discourse and practice. Looking at the predicament between denunciation 
and access, central to humanitarian work, we see how the pervasion of rights-speak has 
influenced that dilemma, and the way humanitarian actors navigate it. Third, taking 
inspiration from Raymond Williams’s keyword approach, this study then zeroes in on the 
term ‘protection’, having identified it as central to this convergence. A closer analysis of 
this term’s evolution, (contested) meanings and uses allows us to unlock understandings 
of this phenomenon. This thesis considers ‘Protection’ –ubiquitous in both discourses– as 
it partly constitutes, and furthers the convergence. This thesis studies the efforts to make 
its definition consensual and some of the consequences of the confusion around it. 
Finally, by analysing the compounded terms of ‘protection of civilians’ and 
‘responsibility to protect’, it explores the ways in which ‘protection’ penetrated UN 
discourse, acting as a Trojan horse for the tensions created by the convergence of human 
rights and humanitarianism 
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Introduction 
Discussing my research with friends and peers I became aware of a stark 
discrepancy between what ‘insiders’ and ‘outsiders’ understand human rights and 
humanitarianism to be. On various occasions, the description of my research interest was 
met with surprise: ‘but aren’t ‘human rights’ and ‘humanitarianism’ basically the same 
thing?’ – a statement that would outrage (most) scholars and practitioners of those 
respective fields, who often detest being associated with one other. I came to think about 
it as what Freud called “the narcissism of minor differences” (1989: 72). A phenomenon 
by which “it is precisely communities with adjoining territories, and related to each other 
in other ways as well, who are engaged in constant feuds” (Ibid.). For undeniably, human 
rights and humanitarianism share origins, objectives, and visions of the world. In fact, 
Anthony Pagden argues, looking as far back as the fifteenth century, that the discourse 
that came to be 'human rights' was most profoundly shaped in relationship to war and its 
excesses (2015: 249). While Stephen Hopgood sees human rights and humanitarianism as 
both taking root in form of ‘humanism’ elevated “into a set of social practices and 
institutions” by nineteenth-century middle-class Europeans (2013: x). Yet, they each 
employ different discourses, different practices, and hold different priorities, thus making 
impossible their conflation into one and the same ‘thing’. 
 
Human rights and humanitarian organisations have come to work increasingly in 
the same contexts; as their respective fields of activities have expanded, the overlap has 
furthered. In parallel, the discourse of human rights has now pervaded each an every 
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discussion on international affairs (Chandler, 2003: 4). This has often been for the best, 
but has also brought about confusion as to human rights’ relationship to humanitarianism. 
In fact, most humanitarian organisations have now had to engage in one way or another 
with the omnipresent ‘rights-speak’. This study will explore the intersection and 
interaction of human rights and humanitarianism through an analysis of the legal 
convergence of International Humanitarian Law (IHL) and International Human Rights 
Law (IHRL), the discourses of human rights and humanitarian organisations, and a study 
of the discourse around protection, its evolution and some of its implications. In fact, 
having increased considerably since the 1990s, the terminology of ‘protection’ is now 
extensively used [and abused] by human rights and humanitarian organisations. Yet, that 
concept is seldom clearly defined and has, at times, become little more than a buzzword.  
I will primarily be analysing discourses of an official nature: publicly available 
reports and press releases. Such discourse is outward oriented, and thus participates to 
framing and shaping the identity of the organisations for the outside world. As such, it 
purports to present the word of the organisations rather than that of individuals within 
these bigger entities. While I do not mean to negate the epistemological question of the 
intersubjective reality of such discourse (Klotz, 2007: 11); a focus on widely accessible, 
official, publication allows us to minimise that intersubjectivity. Quite naturally, 
discourse analysis will be the central methodological tool in this study. Broadly defined, 
discourse analysis designates methodologies “that capture the creation of meaning and 
accompanying processes of communication” (Klotz, 2007: 19). As Foucault has taught 
us, discourse acts as the meeting place for power and knowledge (in Evans, 2005: 1050). 
As such, discourse cannot be limited to the description of external realities, it “acts to 
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signify generalised, socially constructed categories of thought” to which social meanings 
and values are constantly (re)attributed (Ibid: 1049). 
 I will thus trace the evolution of discourses and analyse some of the notable 
ramifications of that evolution for the work of the respective organisations, and more 
broadly, for human rights and humanitarianism. In this context, I will seek to analyse 
trajectories of change and causation, by comparing certain uses of language, and webs of 
meaning at various moments in time. Drawing attention to process, and not exclusively 
on outcomes will allow us to present a distinct picture of the power dynamics, disparities, 
and capabilities at play (Klotz, 2007: 92). I will argue that human rights and 
humanitarianism as discourses and practices have been considerably impacted by their 
convergence, with the former incorporating humanitarian principles and reasoning, and 
the latter largely resisting rights-talk but inexorably affected by its pervasiveness. We 
will see that the adoption, by human rights NGOs of some humanitarian principles has 
allowed for an extension of the scope of protection in certain contexts. However, that 
same phenomenon has also presented fundamental challenges to the human rights ethic. 
By zoning in on the eternal predicament between maintaining access and speaking out, 
we will see how human rights discourses and practices have had an impact on 
‘traditional’ humanitarianism. 
In mapping that convergence, I have selected two big players in the fields of 
human rights and humanitarianism, four unavoidable actors at the forefront of the 
intersection between these two concepts, who inexorably play a major part in shaping the 
discourse: Amnesty International (AI), Human Rights Watch (HRW), the International 
Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), and Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF). As Hopgood 
	   4	  
put it, “[i]f gatekeepers like Human Rights Watch or Amnesty International or the ICRC 
do not adopt an issue, its chances of reaching a global audience are slim.” (2013: 172). It 
is important to acknowledge the limitations of such an approach. By choosing these four 
[Western] international organisations, this present study will undeniably focus on what 
Hopgood called Human Rights (as opposed to human rights), and by extension, on 
Humanitarianism (as opposed to humanitarianism(s)). Having colonised local claims and 
having often presented themselves as sole guardians of certain moral norms, such 
organisation have achieved a certain hegemony –in the Gramscian sense of the term. 
Thus, while it by no means presents a complete picture, the study of their representations 
of certain concepts offers a valuable insight into the discursive field, the dominant 
discourse.  
Throughout this research, inspired by Raymond Williams’ work (1985), I have 
come to think of ‘protection’ as a keyword, in understanding the convergence of 
humanitarianism and human rights. Williams considers certain terms to be ‘keywords’ in 
two connected senses: as “significant, binding words in certain activities and their 
interpretations”, and as “significant, indicative words in certain forms of thought” (Ibid: 
15). It is in that capacity that I will, in the last section of this study, present an analysis of 
‘protection’, exploring the evolution of its meaning(s) for and use(s) by different 
stakeholders. In fact it is crucial to note that here, the question is indeed about meanings, 
not meaning. (Williams, 1985: 16). Because ‘meanings’ are more than general processes 
of ‘signification’, and because ‘norms’ and ‘rules’ are more than the properties of any 
abstract process or system, the analysis needs to go beyond semantics, it needs to delve 
into the ramification of the evolution of meanings and norms (Williams, 1985: 21). I thus 
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conceive of ‘protection’ as a keyword that can help us unlock new understandings of the 
convergence between human rights and humanitarianism. But as it is recurrently used in 
discourses of human rights and humanitarianism, ‘protection’ also constitutes these two 
terms, their intersection and their convergence. I must make clear, however, that this 
analysis is only inspired by Raymond Williams work, and does not pretend to follow his 
format or methodology. Stepping away from the four organisations’ discourses, I will 
present a more general assessment of that term’s meanings, evolutions, and uses – 
notably through the concept of the ‘protection of civilians’ and the ‘responsibility to 
protect’. 
With such a focus on discourse, I situate myself toward the post-positivist end of 
the epistemological spectrum; where meanings are fluid and contested, not static and 
stable. That is not to say that no particular meaning can be treated as somewhat stable in 
certain circumstances. In fact, we must accept enough stability in language to employ it, 
describe and analyse discourse (Klotz, 2007: 14). Before going any further it is thus 
important to present some definitional cues for two terms at the centre of this analysis: 
‘human rights’ and ‘humanitarianism’. 
Again, such an initiative is not necessarily at odds with a post-positivist approach 
as, in Barnett terms, beyond the epistemological debates around the existence of certain 
concepts outside of discourse and subjectivity, one is forced to recognise that over the 
decades, ‘human rights’ and ‘humanitarianism’ “have had distinct meanings” (2011: 16). 
I will therefore present nothing more than the representations of these two concepts that 
this study has chosen to adopt. For our purposes, ‘humanitarianism’ primarily designates 
an ethic, a discourse, and a practice with the objective of alleviating human suffering and 
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protecting human dignity on the basis of need. Finding support and formal legitimacy in 
international humanitarian law, humanitarian discourse and practice exist primarily 
during and in the aftermath of emergencies, “in the temporal present” (Ticktin, 2014: 
281), with limited pretention of longer-term resolution. This limited temporality has, 
however, considerably evolved, now also including longer-term activities; an evolution 
that can be in part traced back to the influence of the ‘rights’ discourse. Oftentimes, the 
definition of ‘humanitarianism’ includes a reference to the principles of humanity, 
impartiality, neutrality, and independence (see OECD definition, OECD, 2010: §184). 
Following Barnett, I contend that these principles are not essential to ‘humanitarianism’, 
but rather, that the ICRC has worked them into its definition of the term; a definition that 
the organisation crafted “in response to the constraints on its goals” (2011: 10). In fact, 
the ICRC has often presented itself as the “guardian of all things humanitarian” (Ibid) but 
represents a particular form of a broader notion. As for the term ‘human rights’ it will 
mainly refer to an ethic, practice and discourse the objective of which is the respect and 
protection of the human dignity of all, in all circumstances. Codified in international 
human rights law, this idea reaches further than humanitarianism, both in its scope and its 
temporality. ‘Human rights’ looks to correct past violations, often seeking justice for the 
victims and accountability for the perpetrators. It also tends to work toward policy change 
in the long term. 
Finally, I wish to contest the often-used dichotomy in which human rights are 
depicted as political and humanitarianism as apolitical. This distinction is specious and 
dangerous; for humanitarianism, like human rights, is an utterly political phenomenon 
(Warner, 1999). The mere fact that the ICRC only operates in contexts in which they 
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have the agreement of the authorities, or that MSF (and ICRC) can use public 
denunciation to apply pressure, speaks to the political nature of humanitarianism. I do not 
mean, however, to flatten the differences in the way in which human rights and 
humanitarianism engage with politics.   
 
I. Literature review  
The extent, nature, and dynamics of the convergence of human rights and 
humanitarianism as discourses and practices have been source of debate among 
specialists in the field. While, the literature on this topic is extremely rich and varied, I 
contend that it has – so far – failed to offer a convincing analysis of the evolution of the 
concept of protection within the evolving humanitarian/human rights nexus. An analysis 
that would, in turn, allow for a clearer understanding of the convergence, and open up 
space moving forward. By looking more closely at some seminal works I will map the 
current state of the debate and point at its shortcomings and limitations. 
The following section will be divided as follows: first I will look at three 
ideological critiques of human rights. David Kennedy’s The Dark Sides of Virtue (2004); 
Samuel Moyn’s The Last Utopia (2010); and Stephen Hopgood’s Endtimes of Human 
Rights (2013). Putting their central claims beside each other, I will show that all three 
bring in ‘humanitarianism’ as a counterpoint, a related field or as synonymous – often 
failing to appropriately define the terms and concepts central to their analyses. Second, I 
will turn to the work of Hugo Slim (1997, 2000, 2001), David Chandler (2001, 2002), 
Michael Barnett (2011), and Didier Fassin (2012, 2013). I will present how these four 
scholars of humanitarianism have described and analysed the intersection. All have 
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strong views on the origin, extent or even existence of that convergence which will allow 
us to get a good sense of the current debate. With a closer analysis of their respective uses 
of terminology, I intend to demonstrate the centrality of the concept of protection –and to 
a lesser extent neutrality and impartiality– in understanding the convergence. As we 
review these studies of human rights and humanitarianism, analyse how both sides of this 
convergence interact, it will become obvious that core principles have become muddled 
and suffer from a sloppy use of terminology. 
1. Ideological critiques of human rights – how is humanitarianism 
regarded? 
In The Dark Side of Virtue, Kennedy offers an insightful, yet rather personal, 
critique of what he calls ‘international humanitarianism’. His ‘humanitarianism’ goes 
well beyond the traditional understanding of the term, and can be simply described as 
‘compassion for other individuals’. However, one has to wait until chapter eight of his 
book to have that definition explicitly stated:  
“I have been using the term ‘humanitarian’ in a far larger sense – to refer very generally 
to people who aspire to make the world more just, to the projects they have launched […] 
in pursuit of that goal, and to the professional vocabularies which have sprung up to 
defend and elaborate these projects.” (Kennedy 2004: 236)  
Throughout his work, Kennedy uses a definition of humanitarianism that encompasses all 
of human rights discourse and practice –and arguably goes beyond that. He uses ‘human 
rights’ and ‘humanitarianism’ interchangeably, perpetuating a certain lack of clarity. In 
fact, it is primarily the pitfalls of international human rights that Kennedy analyses as he 
criticises the international human rights movement for investing in “a vocabulary of the 
general good” (Ibid: 14) and in a knowledge of what is just and unjust (Ibid 21); for its 
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limiting relationship to Western Liberalism (Ibid: 18); and for its hegemonic discourse 
which carries the potential to de-legitimate other political voices and projects (Ibid: 20). 
A similar muddled use of ‘humanitarianism’ can be observed in the 2013 issue of 
Qui Parle?, entirely devoted to Samuel Moyn’s resounding Last Utopia. Human rights 
and humanitarianism are –there again– used interchangeably bringing about an uneasy 
ambiguity and setting the stage for debates in which each side talks right past the other. 
This critique does not apply to Moyn himself. In fact, in his controversial rewriting of the 
history of human rights, in which he identifies international human rights as having only 
emerged in the 1970s, Moyn brings ‘humanitarianism’ into the analysis as a related yet 
distinct field and ideology. He describes humanitarianism as having originally developed 
in “historical independence of the rights talk” but slowly amalgamated “with human 
rights as both a utopian ideal and a practical movement” (Moyn 2010: 220). Moyn 
appears to align himself with the convergence thesis as he notes that today, “human rights 
and humanitarianism are fused enterprises with the former incorporating the latter and the 
latter justified in terms of the former” (Ibid: 221).  
As Moyn argues that human rights represent the current ‘utopia’ having stepped 
in to replace collapsed “universalist schemes” (Ibid: 7), Stephen Hopgood argues that 
“humanism (the cultural precondition for Human Rights) was the secular replacement of 
the Christian god” (2013: x). In Endtimes of Human Rights Hopgood establishes an 
interesting distinction between Human Rights and human rights; the former designating a 
global structure of laws, norms and organisations, and the latter a local activism. While I 
have decided not to replicate Hopgood’s use of capitals here, this study mostly focuses on 
the capitalised form. Hopgood traces the origins of both human rights and 
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humanitarianism back to a certain humanist ideal, which leads him to argue –quite 
provocatively– that the ICRC is indeed the first international human rights organisation, 
the first “secular church of the international” (Ibid). It appears that certain scholars go 
through particular efforts to dissociate human rights from humanitarianism and vice 
versa. This concern does not seem to be shared by all, as some seem unwilling to invest 
in the idea that they are indeed distinct projects.   
In light of the debate presented above, we are in a position to ask whether the 
distinction between humanitarianism and human rights is a useful one; to inquire what is 
at stake when defining these concepts; to question the desirability of fixed definitions. 
While the phenomenon of convergence has brought human rights and humanitarianism 
closer, with human rights and humanitarian actors interacting, evolving in the same 
environments and pursuing similar goals, I contend that their differentiation is still 
valuable and necessary.  
2. Artificially divided, in need of clarification, or irreconcilable? 
The fact that the discourse of human rights has permeated humanitarianism is 
broadly accepted. Some view this phenomenon as dangerous and worrying, linking it to 
the growing acceptance for military interventions (Chandler, 2001; Stockton, 1998), 
some have a more enthusiastic approach, arguing that it “add[s] great strength to the 
humanitarian idea” (Slim, 2000: 14) and others yet, challenge the dominant timeline by 
offering a cautiously critical historicisation (Barnett 2011).  
In a 2001 article, Slim uses the Kantian dichotomy of philanthropy v. rights to 
argue that humanitarianism is divided in its understanding of itself and needs to move 
away from the former to re-centre around the latter. For him, the “explicit adoption of 
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rights by humanitarians” allows to engage with “a proper politics that leads […] to justice 
and to the development of real political contracts between people and power” (Slim, 
2001: 26). Slim thus perceives the rights shift in humanitarianism as desirable; a position 
vehemently contested by Chandler (2001). While both scholars agree on the existence of 
a certain ‘human-rightsisation’ of humanitarianism, they each have very different 
normative judgements of this phenomenon. For Chandler, the influence of human rights 
discourse on humanitarianism has brought about a shift away from empathy and 
emergency aid and towards “mobilizing misanthropy and legitimizing the politics of 
international condemnation, sanctions, and bombings” (Chandler, 2001: 700). The 
influence of human rights NGOs has allowed the establishment of a new, rights-based, 
humanitarian consensus; a consensus that has resulted in the legitimisation of armed 
‘humanitarian’ interventions. Chandler’s argument appears to be quite absolutist insofar 
as it does not account for the co-existence of various humanitarianisms, some more prone 
to embracing rights than others; a limitation that Barnett addresses, notably by 
distinguishing between ‘emergency’ and ‘alchemical’ humanitarianism (Barnett 2011: 
10-11).  In this dichotomy, the former focuses on symptoms, while the latter also has the 
ambition of addressing the root causes of suffering and is thus more prone to including 
human rights (Ibid).  
The temporalities of the human rights/humanitarianism convergence also diverge. 
While most identify the increased rapprochement to have started in the 1990s, after the 
end of the Cold War, Chandler argues that this transformation occurred “during and 
after” the Cold War (2001: 679). Identifying the end of the Cold War as the birth moment 
can indeed be limiting, as it forces some important events and dynamics out of the frame. 
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Barnett goes further, by noting that his initial understanding of humanitarianism was 
greatly influenced by the dominant narrative of the post-Cold War move towards human 
rights; an understanding that “changed radically” after “peering into the ‘before’” (2011: 
5). He argues that humanitarianism’s wariness to associate with human rights was an 
anomaly specific to the Cold War years, as humanitarians had not, historically, limited 
themselves to emergency relief but had been invested in ending “all sources of suffering” 
(Ibid). Barnett also holds that the principles of impartiality and neutrality were “not part 
of humanitarian’s original DNA. Rather, they had fallen into place over decades of action 
and debate” (Ibid: 6). This last statement not only recognises the importance of such 
principles in understanding and analysing humanitarianism, it acknowledges the need to 
conceive of such principles as dynamic, evolving and contested rather than fundamental 
and fixed. 
In the work of all the scholars mentioned above, the political/apolitical dichotomy 
is a recurring one. All seem to invest in the idea that integrating human rights to 
humanitarianism is a ‘politicisation’ of a previously apolitical project. Again, such 
statements should not be taken to support the idea that humanitarianism exists outside of 
politics, but rather, that humanitarianism does not –traditionally– work towards political 
transformations. In fact, as Barnett notes, aid agencies have “always been political 
creatures in one way or another” (2011: 6). Pictet’s metaphor of the ICRC ‘s relation to 
politics as a swimmer who “advances in the water but drowns if he swallows it” (as cited 
in Leebaw, 2007: 225) is rather effective in explaining the imagined relationship between 
the idea of humanitarianism and politics. Didier Fassin’s intervention largely contributes 
to debunking the idea of humanitarianism as apolitical as it sets out to analyse the space 
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that humanitarianism occupies in politics (2013: 37). He develops the idea of 
“humanitarian reason” described as “the principle under which moral sentiments enter the 
political sphere” (Ibid). Fassin does not only argue that humanitarianism is political, but 
also that humanitarian reason has now become “part of our way of making politics” (Ibid: 
39). He writes that “the humanitarian reason associated with human rights” should be 
understood as the third pillar of Foucault’s ‘modern government’ – alongside the police 
state and the liberal economy (Ibid). It is worth noting, here, that Fassin does not seem to 
invest in the human rights/humanitarian distinction. Fassin’s and Kennedy’s 
humanitarianisms thus seems similarly defined: loosely, and with the potential of 
encompassing the idea of human rights. 
3. Terminology - discordance 
In a 1997 article, Slim contests the very grounds for analysing principles 
associated with human rights and humanitarianism as different. By deconstructing and 
analysing the principles of ‘humanity,’ impartiality,’ and ‘solidarity’ he seeks to 
demonstrate that these ideas are –and have always been– compatible both with 
humanitarianism and human rights. Slim holds that the legal foundations of each field are 
much more similar than is usually acknowledged. Furthermore, he presents the Geneva 
Conventions as “full of civil and political rights” (Slim 1997: 345). The confusion would 
thus only stem from different organisations using the same language to describe 
“different positions or no positions” (Ibid: 345). This last point is particularly significant 
as it opens the prospects of harmonious cohabitation –if not merger– of these two 
approaches. For him, human rights and humanitarianism “were never divided in the first 
place”; the “truly humanitarian position” can be reconciled with “full spectrum of human 
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rights” (Ibid: 345-46). In other words, it is nothing but a misunderstanding. Here, Slim 
appears to conflate having similar end goals and core values with utilising the same 
operational methods and setting the same priorities. Indeed, while it is undeniable that 
human rights and humanitarianism share fundamental similarities in their visions of the 
good and are premised on similar values of humanity and dignity of the human person; 
they present very different roadmaps to achieving their objectives, utilise distinctive 
methods and prioritise differently. This argument, discounting all substantial differences 
between human rights and humanitarianism is thus rather unsatisfying.  
In ‘The Politics of Impartial Activism’ (2007), Bronwyn Leebaw also approaches 
the overlap of terminologies, arguing that human rights and humanitarianism conceive 
differently of ‘impartiality.’ She observes that humanitarian and human rights notions of 
impartiality have come to designate different methods, and principles. While 
humanitarians have defined impartiality “in pragmatic terms, as a space apart form 
political conflict, designated to provide aid to the suffering without provoking the 
hostility of combatants” (Leebaw 2007: 224), the human rights movement has 
characterised impartiality as the “distance or disinterest needed to discriminate between 
victim and perpetrator” (Ibid: 227), providing “the basis for moral judgment” (Ibid: 224). 
Leebaw’s contribution bears out the limits of Slim’s assertion that human rights and 
humanitarianism were in fact never different, insofar as these distinctive understandings 
of ‘impartiality’ have been used to justify and develop different strategies and different 
practices. While these strategies and practices might all be premised on an articulation of 
‘impartiality’ they are indeed rooted in different principles, values, and visions of the 
world, making Slim’s suggestion of their easily retrievable compatibility seem less 
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convincing. As James Darcy puts it, “In any situation where the civilian population is in 
danger, the humanitarian and human rights actors may share common cause, but their 
priorities may be different and the strategies they adopt may conflict” (2004: 14).  
For Darcy and Chandler, the approaches to the idea of neutrality are particularly 
significant in studying the convergence at play. Chandler points to humanitarianism’s 
“retreat from the principle of ‘neutrality’” (2001: 679), while Darcy identifies that same 
principle as being “at the heart of debates about rights-based approaches to 
humanitarianism” (2004: 8). Slim presents yet another perspective, giving neutrality less 
importance and credit. He acknowledges that most humanitarian actors are retreating 
from it, but prefers to describe ‘neutrality’ as a “pragmatic operational posture” (1997: 
347) only accessible to a select few. Slim argues, instead, that it is to the “emergence and 
re-definition of the term ‘protection’” that one should look, to find further signs of the 
shift to rights in NGO consciousness (2001: 19). 
The meanings and practices associated to ‘impartiality’, ‘neutrality’ and 
‘protection’ are far from settled and unproblematic. These concepts run through the 
works presented above, sometimes as clear guiding threads throughout the argument, 
sometimes watermarked. And while the significance and centrality of these concepts 
seem quasi-unanimously recognised when studying the intersection of human rights and 
humanitarianism, they have seldom been placed at the centre of the analysis. In this 
study, I intend to map that convergence, analyse the human rights and humanitarian 
discourses as they intersect and interact, and explore the discourse around ‘protection’, 
and –to a lesser extent neutrality and impartiality– to explore the evolution of the human 
rights and humanitarian ethics and practice.  
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II. Mapping the Convergence 
1. Legal convergence a related and co-dependent phenomenon  
1.1 Different Normative Frameworks…  
It is important to differentiate between two phenomena at play here. On the one 
side, the convergence of two bodies of law: international human rights law (IHRL) and 
international humanitarian law (IHL). On the other, the convergence of two ethics, 
practices, and discourses: human rights and humanitarianism. These parallel phenomena 
are deeply interconnected and co-dependent but cannot be conflated. The former has 
brought legitimacy and credibility to the latter, while the latter has sustained and 
encouraged the former. The present study focuses on the interaction of human rights and 
humanitarianism, yet a good understanding of the evolving dynamics of these two bodies 
of law is a necessary precondition to such an analysis. In this section, I will thus briefly 
present each of these bodies of law, and their converging evolutions. 
The core of IHL, or law of armed conflict, is laid out in the four Geneva 
Conventions of 1949 and their two Additional Protocols of 1977. For the purpose of this 
paper, we shall primarily focus on Article 3, common to all four Geneva Conventions 
(CA 3), the Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of 
War (commonly known as the Fourth Geneva Convention, or GC IV), as well as 
Additional Protocols I and II (AP I and AP II). The evolution of IHL can be observed, 
notably, by looking at customary law. For that, the extensive customary law study 
commissioned by the ICRC in 2005 is an extremely useful resource (Henckaerts and 
Doswald-Beck, 2005). IHRL’s normative framework is principally found in what is 
commonly called the international Bill of Rights. That is, the United Nations’ Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) (UN, 1948), the International Covenant for Civil 
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and Political Rights (ICCPR) (OHCHR, 1966), and the International Covenant for 
Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) (OHCHR, 1966). This core is 
supported by plethora of treaties on particular sets of rights or particular vulnerable 
populations (i.e. Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading 
Treatment or Punishment (CAT) (OHCHR, 1984) or the Convention on the Rights of the 
Child (CRC) (OHCHR, 1989)). All conventions mentioned above enjoy a very high level 
of ratification with virtually all states having agreed to be bound by them.1  
In situations of emergency where the life of the state is under threat, IHRL allows 
for derogations. That is to say that it allows the state to withdraw certain rights and 
freedoms deemed ‘non-essential,’ within a defined framework. Some core rights however 
are non-derogable, and therefore remain unaffected by derogations. This group of core 
rights typically includes the right to life, to humane treatment, freedom from slavery, 
freedom from punishment without law. By allowing extreme measure and little 
accountability for the state, this clause of emergency is the “Achille’s heel of the human 
rights” protection regime (Rajagopal, 2003: 176). However, in its General Comment 29 
on ICCPR article 4 (UNHRC, 2001), the Human Rights Committee introduced an 
important clarification to the derogability principle. It established an intrinsic connection 
between some non-derogable and some derogable rights thus restricting the gap between 
these two sets of rights. In paragraph 15, the HRC notes: “It is inherent in the protection 
of rights explicitly recognized as non-derogable in article 4, paragraph 2, that they must 
be secured by procedural guarantees, including, often, judicial guarantees” (Ibid: §15). In 
other words, the [derogable] rights to procedural and judicial guarantees are essential to 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 With the notable exception of the United States of America which has ratified neither the 
ICESCR, nor the CRC. Further, the USA has signed, but not ratified API and APII. 
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the full respect of certain non-derogable rights, such as the right to life. As such, the HRC 
concludes that “as article 6 [right to life] of the Covenant is non-derogable in its entirety, 
any trial leading to the imposition of the death penalty during a state of emergency must 
conform to the provisions of the Covenant, including all the requirements of articles 14 
and 15 [right to procedural and judicial guarantees].” (Ibid.). 
The right to life is formulated in the third article of the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights (UDHR, 1948) and reaffirmed in the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights (ICCPR, 1966) article 6. Under the human rights framework, that right 
can only be constricted in exceptional circumstances; circumstances similar to those 
framing law enforcement activities (ECHR, 1950: art.2(2)). The right to life is considered 
fundamental and is thus exempt from derogation (Ibid: art. 4(2)) –except in the European 
Convention on Human Rights (Sassòli & Olsen, 2008: 611) that allows for a caveat to the 
non-derogability of the right to life,  “in respect of deaths resulting from the lawful actors 
of war” (Ibid: art. 15(2)). Article 15(2) of the ECHR therefore suggests that, when in 
situations of armed conflict, the scope of right-to-life protections must defer to the laws 
of war; a deferral that carries the risk of compromising some of the foundational 
principles of human rights. In fact, while human rights, by definition, afford protections 
to individuals2 qua humans, IHL affords protections to individuals by virtue of their 
belonging to particular categories of ‘protected persons’.  
IHL does not allow for any derogation as it applies, precisely, in situations of 
armed conflict, and thus often of emergency. This body of law was conceived to provide 
protections in already sub-optimal, exceptional circumstances; it can therefore incur no 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 The argument has been made that human rights also afford protections to groups of individuals. 
See the exchange between Kymlicka (1991; 1992) and Kukathas (1992a; 1992b) for differing 
accounts of the role of group rights in relation to individual rights. 
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derogations. Ruling situations where death is inevitable, it is far less protective of the 
right to life. Far from conceiving of such a right as absolute, IHL provides a series of 
rules and principles delimiting the lawful deprivation of life in armed conflict. As Audrey 
Benison puts it, on a normative level, “humanitarian law contemplates a starting point of 
death, violence, and destruction that is repugnant to the essence of human rights law." 
(1999: 152). In Stephen Hopgood’s terms, “[w]ar is always a human rights violation 
waiting to be converted into a crime” (2013: 122). Most interestingly, IHL allows for an 
allocation of duties and responsibilities going beyond the traditionally state-centric model 
of human rights law. In fact, as stated in CA 3, IHL is binding to “each Party to the 
conflict” (GC IV, 1949: art. 3). Which, in some situations of armed conflict, includes 
non-state armed groups.  
 It is important to note that the laws of armed conflict afford weaker protections 
when the armed conflict is not international. From a hard law perspective, only CA 3, 
standing as a mini-convention, is applicable in all situations of armed conflict. AP II only 
applies to non-international armed conflict past a certain threshold (determined somehow 
arbitrarily based on the intensity, duration, and nature of the parties to the conflict). As 
for the rest of GCs I-IV and AP I, they only concern international armed conflict. This 
gap, however, has been considerably reduced by the evolution of customary law. The 
International Committee of the Red Cross, as a central actor in the development of 
protection norms, has been instrumental to that phenomenon. In fact, a thorough study 
commissioned by the ICRC in 2005 suggests that virtually all rules regulating 
international armed conflict have now reached the status of custom in situations of armed 
conflict not of an international character (Henckaerts & Doswald-Beck, 2005). It is the 
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case, for example, of the principles of precaution, proportionality, and distinction, which 
are of particular importance in the context of this analysis. They are laid out in AP I 
articles 57, 51(5) and 51(4) respectively, and reaffirmed in rules 15, 14, and 11 of the 
customary IHL study; where they are deemed relevant to both international and non-
international armed conflict.  
In short, as originally conceived, IHRL is applicable –to states– in all 
circumstance, but can be derogated from. As for IHL, it is solely applicable in situations 
of armed conflict (international or not) to all parties to the conflict, and without the 
possibility for derogation. IHRL is primarily based on rights while IHL is premised on 
legal injunctions and prohibitions (Slim 2000: 14). Finally, the application of IHL rules 
varies according to the qualification of the conflict as a whole while IHRL does not 
distinguish between different kinds of conflict (Krieger, 2006: 279).  
Both IHL and IHRL have similar philosophical roots, both holding the protection 
of human dignity at the heart of their project. Even in some of the founding documents of 
each of these two bodies of law, these common origins are manifest. William Hitchcock 
identifies the Geneva Conventions of 1949 as marking a notable shift in IHL, so much so 
that he argues for them to be considered alongside “other documents that form ‘the 
human rights revolution’ of the 1940s” (2012: 98). For Hitchcock, the 1949 Conventions 
introduced key human rights assumptions to the laws of war, premised on inviolable 
individual rights of the human person, and extending protections to other, previously 
unprotected categories (Hitchcock, 2012). 
It is indeed possible to find clear human rights inflexions in various articles of the 
Geneva Conventions and their Additional Protocols. The language of Common Article 3 
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for example, clearly echoes that of the UDHR (Meron, 2000: 246). Its first paragraph 
reads as follows: “Persons taking no active part in the hostilities […] shall in all 
circumstances be treated humanely, without any adverse distinction founded on race, 
colour, religion or faith, sex, birth or wealth, or any other similar criteria.” (ICRC, 
1949a: art. 3) [emphasis added]. The italicised clause articulates the principle of non-
discrimination at the centre of the human rights project and can be seen, in this context, 
as an expression of the principle of impartiality, so dear to classical humanitarian action. 
Similarly, Article 75 of Additional Protocol I, entitled ‘Fundamental Guarantees’ is 
astoundingly similar to Article 14 of the ICCPR. Conversely, humanitarian law-type 
provisions can be found in human rights law. The provisions on child soldiers in the 
Convention on the Rights of the Child and its Protocol on the Involvement of Children in 
Armed Conflict is an example of such provisions (Henckaerts and Doswald-Beck, 2005: 
xxxvii). The 1968 UN International Conference on Human Rights held in Tehran began 
to codify this interconnection by “establishing an official link between human rights and 
IHL” (Balendra, 2008: 2481). Looking more closely at the evolution of their respective 
scopes of application will give us a good sense of the mutual influence of IHRL and IHL. 
1.2  …Having experienced a rapprochement 
These distinctions seem to not be as clear-cut today as they once were. Theodor 
Meron has long noted a “growing convergence” (2000: 239) of IHL and IHRL, a 
convergence that has gained momentum since the beginning of the 1990s, pushed by a 
changing nature of conflicts (increasingly internal) and facilitated by a growing body of 
customary international law (Ibid, 243-4). In fact, IHL was initially developed for a 
prototypical state v. state war, far from the today’s ‘norm’. Meron describes this 
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convergence by studying the evolution of IHL, and describes the phenomenon as a The 
Humanization of Humanitarian Law. Similarly, Stephen Hopgood argues that human 
rights law has “slowly but surely colonized international humanitarian law in world 
politics” (2013: 120). While it undoubtedly picked up the pace after the end of the Cold 
War, the origins of this legal convergence are to be found much earlier, notably with the 
Genocide Convention of 1948. Part of the post-war efforts to develop international law, 
this convention codified individual criminal responsibility for acts of genocide equally in 
times international conflict, internal conflict, and peace (Greppi, 1999; Griffin, 2000). 
Furthermore, it participated to the development of the justiciability of human rights law 
(Kennedy, 2004: 253-54). 
The ICRC’s two-volume customary IHL study maps –and has arguably 
strengthened– the-said ‘humanization’ (or ‘humanrights-ization’) of IHL (Henckaerts and 
Doswald-Beck, 2005). By compiling this set of rules from general practice, the Geneva-
based institution contributed to filling the gaps left by treaty law, offering a more 
thorough protection to victims. In that study, as mentioned above, the large majority of 
customary IHL rules are presented as applying to both international and non-international 
armed conflict. Henckaerts and Doswald-Beck notably mention the “extensive practice 
by States and by international organisations” to comment “on the behaviour of States 
during armed conflict in the light of human rights law” (Ibid: xxxvii) thus acknowledging 
the influence of IHRL on the development of customary IHL.3 In Humanity’s Law 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 It is important to acknowledge here, that the ICRC customary law study has faced significant 
criticism for the nature of the evidence it presented in justifying the customary nature of certain 
rules of international humanitarian law. Most notably, Bellinger and Haynes (2007), two lawyers 
presenting the official U.S. response to the study, have voiced concerns about its rigour. They 
notably point to the insufficient density of the evidence in determining settled state practice. 
Furthermore, they argue that the study relies too much “on written materials, such as military 
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(2011), Ruti Teitel takes the convergence argument further, contending that IHL and 
IHRL have progressively merged to create a hybrid: ‘humanity’s law’; a legal regime that 
“reaches beyond states and their interests and obligations, to the rights and 
responsibilities of persons and peoples” (Ibid: 16). It is worth noting here that Teitel goes 
as far as the Renaissance in the mapping of that convergence. In a similar vein, David 
Kennedy argues that international lawyers have “developed an integrated way to thinking 
about warfare, which combines elements of the human rights tradition, as well as the 
tradition of humanitarian law and collective security”, an integrated approach that he 
calls “the modern law of force” (Kennedy, 2004: 237). 
This convergence has led to a blurring of the protections afforded in international 
or non-international armed conflict, as well as between those that apply in times of war, 
or peace (Leebaw, 2014: 263). This can be observed in the jurisdiction of the ad hoc 
tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda, where –unlike at Nuremberg– the 
application of IHL is not limited to situations where a ‘nexus’ to an international armed 
conflict could be established (see UN, 1945: art. 6(c)). In other words, the jurisdiction of 
the ICTY and ICTR also extend to systematic abuses against civilian populations whether 
technically committed in times of armed conflict or not (Leebaw, 2014: 263).  
It is worth noting that often, the legal convergence is analysed by mapping the 
changes in IHL exclusively, leaving out part of the story. In fact, human rights law has 
also been affected by the convergence, notably with regional courts and commissions 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
manuals and other guidelines published by States, as opposed to actual operational practice by 
States during armed conflict” (Ibid: 445). One of the authors of the study offered a response to 
their remarks (see Henckaerts, 2007). As Geoffrey Best put it when discussing the discrepancy 
between the law and practice around the prohibition of reprisals: “Did not protective enthusiasm 
here run riskily ahead of armed-conflict practicality” (1994: 393). While settling such a debate is 
far beyond the scope of this study, we must keep in mind some of the potential limitations of 
customary IHL developments. 
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incorporating IHL principles in their reasoning. The Inter-American system has since the 
late 1990s appealed quite consistently to the principle of lex specialis, turning to IHL for 
guidance in situations of armed confrontations.4 For example, in the seminal Tablada 
case, The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (IACHR) held that “civilians 
[…] who attacked the Tablada base […] are subject to direct individualized attack to the 
same extent as combatants” (IACHR 1998a; §178) and then exclusively applied 
humanitarian law (applicable to international armed conflicts) to those attackers (Sassóli 
& Olson, 2008: 611). What is more, in its decision in Bamaca Velasquez v. Guatemala, 
the IACHR declared acknowledging the “normative and interpretative convergences 
between International Law of Human Rights and International Humanitarian Law” (2000: 
§27). 
In some cases relating notably to the situation in Northern Cyprus and in South-
Eastern Turkey, the European human rights bodies have also turned to IHL. In Varnava 
and Others v. Turkey, the Court ruled that the right to life (article 2) “must be interpreted 
in so far as possible in light of the general principles of international law, including the 
rules of international humanitarian law” (ECtHR, 2009: §185) [emphasis added]. 
Similarly, in Benzer and Others v. Turkey, the court identified CA3 of the Geneva 
Conventions as “relevant international material” (ECtHR, 2013: §89). The Court then 
went on to declare that the “indiscriminate aerial bombardment of civilians and their 
villages cannot be reconcilable […] with the customary rules of international 
humanitarian law” (Ibid: §184). Going beyond the direct references to IHL – namely the 
Geneva Conventions, its Additional Protocols, and customary IHL – one can thus notice 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 Abella v. Argentina [aka Tablada case] (1998a), Saavedra v. Peru (1998b), Bamaca Velasquez 
v. Guatemala (2000), Las Palmeras v. Colombia (2002) are all cases in which the Inter-American 
Commission appealed to article 3 common to the four Geneva Conventions.  
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that IHL language has been used rather consistently when adjudicating in situations of 
armed conflict or occupation. The Inter-American and European Commissions and 
Courts have indeed used concepts clearly borrowed from IHL, such as ‘proportional use 
of force’, ‘disproportionate use of a combat weapon’, or ‘indiscriminate aerial bombing’ 
(Reidy, 1998; Balendra, 2008: 2484). This phenomenon also indicates the convergence of 
IHL and IHRL. One could argue that it is even more significant than the direct references 
to IHL provisions, as in these cases IHL is truly incorporated into IHRL.  
Another manifestation of this convergence can be found in the ECtHR’s decision 
to use IHL in its determination of the extraterritorial applicability of human rights. This 
question has been brought to the court on various occasions when petitioners have 
claimed that their human rights were violated in situations of international armed conflict, 
and foreign occupation. 5 As article 1 of the European Convention on Human Rights 
states that the High Contracting Parties “shall secure to everyone within their 
jurisdiction” the rights and freedom it then lays out (Council of Europe, 1950: art.1), the 
European Court of Human Rights has had to use IHL principles to determine whether the 
human rights law framework applied extraterritorially, to determine whether the 
petitioners were ‘within their jurisdiction’. Similarly, according to the second article of 
the ICCPR, states have an obligation to ensure and respect the rights of “all individuals 
within its territory and subject to its jurisdiction” (OHCHR, 1966: art.2(1)), making the 
establishment of jurisdiction a precondition to any further decision. In most situations 
these provisions do not represent a particular challenge to determining the jurisdiction of 
the court adjudicating on such issues. However, when courts are asked to take decisions 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 See Loizidou v. Turkey, 1995; Bankovic and Others v. Beligium and 16 Other Contracting 
States, 2002; Al-Skeini and Others v. United Kingdom, 2011 
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on alleged human rights violations committed during an international armed conflict, on 
the territory of another state or under occupation, the exact significance of this single 
word, ‘jurisdiction’, takes paramount importance (Milanovic, 2012: 122). As Lubell 
notes, the problem of extraterritorial obligations is “primarily of relevance to 
international armed conflict, since it is in such situations that a State is likely to be 
operating outside its borders” (2005: 739). 
There are three main models to interpret ‘jurisdiction’: a spatial (based on 
determining effective control over a territory), a personal (based on determining effective 
control over an individual), and a mixed one (see Milanovic, 2011: 119-228). Most 
relevant for our purposes, the Al-Skeini case, concerning six men killed during the British 
occupation of Basra (Iraq) (ECtHR, 2011). In its decision, the Grand Chamber cited IHL 
in its reasoning (Ibid: §89) to determine Basra’s status as occupied territory and 
determine the duties of the occupying power under international humanitarian law. 
Finally, the court established that there was indeed a “jurisdictional link between the 
deceased and the United Kingdom” (Ibid: §149), and ruled that “the applicants’ deceased 
relatives fell within the jurisdiction of the respondent State” and thus dismissed “the 
Government's preliminary objection as regards jurisdiction” (Ibid: decision 4). In a 
decision informed by IHL, the court thus found that the protections of the ECHR extend 
to occupied territories under clearly established control of a contracting party.  
This growing legal convergence has to be analysed in parallel with the 
convergence of human rights and humanitarian praxes as exemplified by the adoption in 
1990 of the Declaration of Minimum Humanitarian Standards or Turku Declaration 
(IFRC, 1990); a declaration that draws heavily on human rights considerations with the 
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aim of – as its name indicates – codifying a number of minimum humanitarian standards 
to be followed in all circumstances, including those to which IHL is not technically 
applicable (Abi Saad, 1997: 118-9). Thus human rights seem to have permeated 
humanitarian standards of action while an IHL-informed approaches have allowed human 
rights courts and commissions to sharpen their analyses of violations in situations of 
conflict –by, for example, taking into consideration issues of proportionality, 
discrimination, and precaution. The law cannot and should not be considered 
independently of narrative or of the “norms that give sad and sentimental tales their 
resonance” (Laqueur 2009: 37). The two are mutually constitutive and co-dependent.  
2. Convergence in the discourse  
First, there has been an increased overlap in the thematic and geographical areas 
of interest and action of humanitarian and human rights organisations. On one side 
humanitarian organisations traditionally working mostly in situations of armed conflict 
have extended their scope of activities to include contexts that cannot be characterised as 
armed conflicts. For example, there has been an upsurge of ICRC activities in ‘other 
situations of violence’; situations that the ICRC itself does not qualify as armed conflicts 
and thus where the bulk of IHL does not apply – in fact, most of the GC and AP 
provisions fall short in protecting victims in situations of internal strife. In such contexts, 
the ICRC has a right of ‘humanitarian initiative’ – set out in the Red Cross Statutes 
(ICRC, 2006: art. 5(3)) – whereby it can offer its services to the governments in question, 
but its activities are not grounded in IHL in the same way. As a recent ICRC policy 
document acknowledges, the fundamental rules protecting persons in ‘other situations of 
violence’ are “for the most part contained in international human rights law and domestic 
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legislation” (ICRC, 2014b: 289). This expression ‘other situations of violence’ is a recent 
evolution of ICRC discourse, and designates “situations in which acts of violence are 
perpetrated collectively but which are below the threshold of armed conflict” (Ibid: 278). 
Incorporated into the ICRC Mission Statement in 2008, the expression came to replace 
‘internal disturbances’ and ‘internal tensions’; terms that tended to describe situations 
very similar in nature to non-international armed conflict but that had not reached the 
necessary threshold of intensity or duration to be qualified as such (ICRC, 2008). The 
1986 Red Cross Statute sets out the ICRC’s role “to endeavour at all times […] to ensure 
the protection of and assistance to military and civilians” (ICRC, 2006: Art. 5(2)(d)) 
[emphasis added], thus leaving the door open for the institution to act in situations that do 
not pass the threshold of an armed conflict. This recent increase in the ICRC’s actions in 
‘other situations of violence’ can notably be explained by the need to adapt to the 
changing nature of armed conflict. In a 2011 report on ‘IHL and the challenges of 
contemporary armed conflict’, the ICRC notes, for example, that “recent situations of 
civil unrest in North Africa and the Middle East have in contexts such as Libya 
degenerated into NIACs [non-international armed conflict (sic.)]” and “[i]n other 
contexts such as Iraq and Yemen, civil unrest has occurred against the backdrop of pre-
existing armed conflicts” (ICRC, 2011: 7). This muddling of lines between non-
international armed conflict and ‘other situations of violence’ has pushed the ICRC to use 
its right of ‘humanitarian initiative’ more frequently, and prop up its action in situations 
that do not meet the threshold of applicability of Common Article 3. The cases of persons 
detained in the context of the so-called ‘war on terror’ also present an institutional 
challenge for the ICRC, as their status is not necessarily obvious when their capture does 
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not occur in the context of an armed conflict. The ICRC often uses its right of 
humanitarian initiative to offer its services to the detaining authorities and monitor their 
conditions of detention. True to its needs-based approach, the ICRC thus increased its 
presence, responding to identified growing humanitarian needs in ‘other situations of 
violence’. But this gap in IHL protection is not new. Already identified at the 1949 
diplomatic conference called to adopt the new GCs (Momtaz, 1998), it was further 
addressed by Theodor Meron in his 1984 plea for a ‘Humanitarian Declaration on 
Internal Strife’; a declaration that eventually materialised in 1990, at Turku. In his article, 
Meron notes the “frequency and cruelty of situations of internal strife, the widespread 
denial of applicability of humanitarian law, the limited number of ratifications of some of 
the human rights instruments, the inadequacy of the nonderogable provisions, and the 
abuse of the right of derogation” (Meron, 1984: 859). His observations are echoed in the 
Preamble of the Turku declaration as it states:  
“Considering that situations of internal violence, disturbances, tensions 
and public emergency continue to cause serious instability and great 
suffering in all parts of the world;[…] 
Noting that international law relating to human rights and humanitarian 
norms applicable in armed conflicts to not adequately protect human 
beings in situations of internal violence, disturbances, tensions and public 
emergency” (IFRC, 1990). 
According to the ICRC, the term ‘other situations of violence’ allows the inclusion of 
other forms of violence such as gang, cartel or mafia violence – often international in 
nature (ICRC, 2008: 280). Actions like that of the ICRC on urban gang violence 
(Pfanner, 2010) is a fitting example of the organisation’s involvement in ‘other situations 
of violence’.  
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MSF’s action has – by nature – included contexts in which IHL is not a 
framework of reference. A primarily medical organisation, MSF does not have a mandate 
limited to situations of armed conflict. As former MSF President Jean-Hervé Bradol 
notes, MSF’s philosophy is that “[w]ar is not the only arena where the death of a part of 
humanity is played out” (2004: 7) and therefore, there is no valid reason for the 
organisation’s activities to be limited to such contexts (Ibid: 8-9). 
On the other side, Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International have given 
increased attention to situations of armed conflict. Prototypical international human rights 
organisations, these two actors do not have a mandate rooted in law; they tend to favour 
openly accusatory advocacy strategies and do not –historically– focus on the protection 
of civilians in armed conflict. However, both organisations have reported on situations of 
conflict since the 1980s and have increasingly incorporated such situations in their scope 
of action. Amnesty established a Mandate Review Committee (MRC) in 1988, to explore 
the possibility of extending the scope of the organisation’s mandate (Hopgood, 2006: 95). 
Notably, AI came under pressure to undertake crisis response and include more situations 
of armed conflict in its mandate (Ibid: 75). Only in its more recent general mandate 
review concluded in 2001, did Amnesty gain “the flexibility to respond to human rights 
abuses in armed conflict in various ways” (AI Archive, 2002: 18). It is worth noting, 
however, that the role of the organisation in situations of armed conflict has been a 
subject of internal discussion since at least 1984, as shown by an internal memorandum 
between Steve Abrams and the AI USA’s board of November 14, 1984 (AI archive, 
1984: box I.1 6), and by a resolution unanimously adopted at the International Committee 
Meeting (ICM) in 1985. That resolution entitled ‘Amnesty International’s Role In 
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Situations Of Armed Conflict And Internal Strife’ welcomed the thorough study on the 
subject prepared by the International Secretariat, and recommended that “the IEC 
[international Executive Committee sic.] continue to keep this matter under study” (Ibid). 
Since 2008, AI’s website has included ‘armed conflict’ in its list of ‘human rights topics’ 
(AI, 2008). Today, AI devotes an entire section to the issue under the ‘What We Do’ tab 
of its website (AI, 2016). Under that section, AI goes on to describe the rules that apply 
in such situations, enumerating the IHL principles of proportionality, distinction and 
precaution.  
HRW, while not identifying it as a discrete thematic focus, has reported 
extensively on situations of armed conflict, rooting its reporting in IHL as well as IHRL. 
We can also notice an evolution in HRW’s focus on situations of armed conflict. While in 
1984, already, it reported on violations in such situation, and supported its findings with 
international humanitarian law provisions; it has since developed a much more elaborate 
use of IHL. Looking through the archived files of ex-HRW executive director Jeri Laber, 
I was surprised to find, in a box of material around a 1984 report on Afghanistan, a folder 
entitled ‘Geneva Conventions’ with a single photocopied sheet of paper of common 
article 3 in it (HRW Archive, 1984: Box 2).  While merely anecdotal, this episode shows 
that HRW initially made quite rudimentary use of IHL in its work.  By contrast, Kennedy 
reveals that in 2012, HRW had recently hired “the man who had assessed the 
proportionality of American targeting for the Pentagon to do the same exercise for 
Human Rights Watch” (2012: 31). Since 2014, HRW’s website states that its work is 
guided “by international human rights and humanitarian law” (HRW, 2014) [emphasis 
added]. And its more recent reports are often deeply rooted in IHL, with some 
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exclusively appealing to that body of law. The 2015 report on Yemen entitled ‘Targeting 
Saada’ (HRW: 2015b), for example, mentions international humanitarian law 20 times, 
and human rights law only once in the main text. In addition, that same report only 
mentions ‘human rights’ when naming an organisation (i.e. Human Rights Watch, 
OHCHR, the Yemen Center for Human Rights…) or when citing UNSC resolution 2140 
(Ibid: 5). In 2015, Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch have respectively 
mentioned, or appealed to IHL in over 22% and just under 25% of their English language 
research publications; giving us an idea of the propensity of these two organisations to 
use IHL in their work today.6 But beyond this quantitative data, it is important to study 
how HRW and AI appeal to IHL principles in their reporting and the different 
consequences of using such discourse. 
2.1 Appeal to IHL norms by human rights INGOs 
I shall now focus on Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International reports on 
situations of armed conflict, with the objective of studying these organisations’ approach 
and utilisation of humanitarian principles. As Ron Dudai points out, the language, 
parameters, and type of material included or excluded from human rights reports can tell 
us a lot “about the assumptions, ambitions, and state of mind of the human rights 
movement” (2009: 247). The way in which the law is included in the narrative is an 
important indicator. For the human rights report genre, substantive engagement in legal 
frameworks constitutes a “necessary anchor on policy and practice” (McEvoy as cited in, 
Ibid: 249). The law is in fact never independent from narrative. Narrative gives laws and 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 Amnesty International has 164 English language research publications for 2015 listed on its 
website. 37 of which mention IHL at least twice. Human Rights Watch has 73 reports in English 
for the year 2015 (excluding its 2015 world report) listed on its website. 18 of which mention IHL 
provisions and/or appeal to IHL principles. 
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norms their meaning, transforming then into “a world in which we live”. The relationship 
is thus reciprocal; the two are mutually constitutive (Laqueur, 2009: 37). 
In general, it appears that Amnesty has embraced the use of IHL later than HRW 
– or, rather, than the ‘Watch Committees’ that predated HRW. In fact, we can see that AI 
reports seldom referred to specific IHL provisions before the 1990s. Having looked at 
over 30 publicly available reports on situations of armed conflict between 1985 and 1997, 
it appears that 19 make no mention of IHL whatsoever, while only three (one published 
in 1992 and two in 1996) seem to substantially engage with provisions and principles of 
that body of law. It is a rather different picture with HRW, which embraced laws of war 
as a framework earlier. While we are far from today’s systematic and detailed use of IHL, 
among 20 reports on situations of armed conflict published by HRW between 1984 and 
1997, eleven make references to specific provisions of the Geneva Conventions and/or 
their Additional Protocols. By comparing the two organisations’ coverage of the First 
Gulf War of 1991, we see that in all of its six publications on the subject, HRW supports 
its findings and recommendations with IHL provisions, while Amnesty only mentions the 
Geneva Conventions once –in passing– in one of its five publications around the conflict. 
In two of its publications, Amnesty does however use humanitarian legal terminology 
through the mention of ‘indiscriminate bombardment’ of civilian targets. HRW does so, 
much more systematically, mentioning for example the “rule of proportionality as it 
applies to collateral civilian casualties” (HRW, 1991a). In the report Needless Deaths In 
The Gulf War (HRW, 1991b), Human Rights Watch devotes an entire chapter to “the 
legal regime governing the conduct of air warfare’ in which are outlined in detail, the 
provisions of IHL applicable in that particular situation. The principles of military 
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necessity, of civilian immunity, of distinction, of proportionality, and of precaution are all 
outlined, and applied to the conflict in question. It thus suggests that HRW generally 
adopted a more legalistic approach than AI, and embraced the use of IHL with less 
reticence. This different degree of reliance on the law can be traced back to the two 
organisations’ origins, with HRW –or rather it’s predecessor Helsinki Watch– having 
been specifically created to monitor the application of the Helsinki Accords, and AI 
having been created to defend “transcendent principles” (Hopgood, 2006: 217). This 
observation brings Hopgood to argue that AI is “not first and foremost a human rights 
organization at all”, but a “Free Church” championing “the cause of human rights […] as 
a means to broadcast that moral authority” (Ibid.). As such, Amnesty has tended to rely 
much more on grassroots mobilisation in pushing for change, while HRW, preferring an 
elitist model, has tended to focus on bringing about change from above, influencing those 
with the power to make important decisions. As some HRW employees like to say, AI 
will work to mobilise thousands on the steps on Congress, while HRW will work to 
getting the right advocate to sit down with Congressmen and women. With different 
target audiences, these respective models have called for different styles of reporting. 
Yet, the distinction between the two groups’ approaches has considerably diminished in 
recent years. If we look at their reporting on the more recent invasion of Iraq in 2003 (see 
annexes 3 and 4), we see that Amnesty has fully incorporated IHL in its legal framework. 
For instance, it published a report entitled Respecting International Humanitarian Law 
(AI, 2003a) in which no less that sixteen articles of the Geneva Conventions or its 
Additional Protocols are cited. 
	   35	  
This convergence in the discourse and the appropriation/use of IHL principles and 
terminology by human rights organisations has some notable repercussions on the way 
these organisations present themselves, the wider human rights movement, and human 
rights as an ideal. First, the increased interest of human rights organisations for situations 
of armed conflict, and the growing acceptance of the IHL framework have contributed to 
considering non-state actors as an advocacy target with humanitarian and human rights 
duties. This inclusion of non-state armed groups was usually introduced in human rights 
reports through IHL’s applicability to ‘all parties to the conflict’. As such, while non-
state armed groups could not technically be held accountable for human rights violations, 
they could be condemned for their non-compliance with IHL. In fact, we see both in AI 
and HRW publications that non-state actors are now commonly called upon, with a 
number of recommendations targeting them. Recent examples include HRW reports on 
abuses committed by militias in Iraq (HRW, 2015a; 2015c), as well as AI’s coverage of 
the conflict in Yemen, and its focus on the Houthis’ “crackdown on human rights 
defenders and NGOs” (AI, 2015). As this last quote suggests, non-state groups are now 
not only denounced for violating their obligations under IHL, but also for committing 
human rights abuses. This inclusion of non-state armed groups is the result of a gradual 
evolution. To study this evolution at Amnesty one must look at the evolution of the 
organisation’s mandate. In fact, AI’s work is guided by a statute that can only be 
amended by a two-thirds majority vote of the International Council. Such an amendment 
of the mandate occurred through the 1988-1991 Mandate Review Committee mentioned 
above. In that process, the AI’s International Council agreed to bring within its purview 
quasi- and non-governmental entities that are political in nature, and to hold them to the 
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same standards as states (Hopgood, 2006: 120). While AI had been considering armed 
groups since 1983, the definition with which the organisation was working at the time 
limited its action to quasi-governmental entities with a certain degree of control over a 
territory and a certain organisational structure (Dudai & McEvoy, 2012: 8). Thus AI’s 
principled position allowing it to campaign on armed groups more consistently [only] 
dates from the 1991 mandate review (Ibid). This inclusion of non-state armed groups 
definitely bore the mark of the convergence with humanitarian principles as IHL was 
mentioned recurrently when discussing the new qualifying threshold of armed political 
group (AI archives, 1989: Box I.1 12 IC Minutes – Nov.18).  Furthermore, in a 1993 
publication entitled Putting the Spotlight on Armed Opposition Groups, Amnesty restated 
the importance of IHL in the rationale to address abuses by non-state groups: 
“The principles of humanitarian law, which apply to international and non-
international armed conflict alike, do, in fact, apply both to governments and to any 
political movement fielding armed forces in open conflict. As a consequence, 
Amnesty International will increasingly be placing before the public eye violations 
of these fundamental principles both by opposition groups -- and by governments 
which are nominally pledged to the rule of law” (Amnesty, 1993: 4). 
While not bound by the same constraints as Amnesty regarding the evolution of the 
statute, Human Rights Watch followed a similar trajectory. The Watch Committees 
initially did not cover non-state actors, but in the mid-1980s, Americas Watch began 
researching abuses committed by groups in Central America (Dudai & McEvoy, 2012: 
8). It is also in those reports addressing abuses of the Salvadorian FMLN and the 
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Nicaraguan ‘Contras’ that the organisation began to rely on IHL provisions and principles 
(Ibid.).7  
This evolution in reporting has had far reaching consequences as it has gradually 
extended to issues beyond IHL (Clapham, 2006), and has had “knock-on consequences 
for local human rights organizations throughout the world” (Dudai & McEvoy, 2012: 2). 
In fact, while IHL played an important role in supporting this expansion through the ‘all 
parties to the conflict’ clause, human rights organisations are now going beyond the 
normative framework of humanitarian law to include recommendations about child 
soldiers, denial of freedom of expression, and abuses against humanitarian workers 
(Clapham, 2006: 511).8 It is worth noting here that Clapham’s observations are not as 
applicable to HRW as they are to Amnesty. HRW, arguably more attached to the letter of 
the law, seems to be warier of allocating human rights obligations to non-state actors. 
However, reaching beyond the NGO community, the issue of accountability for non-state 
actors has also been taken up by some United Nations Special Rapporteurs. In a report 
published in March 2006, Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary 
Executions, Philip Alston argued that as a non-state actor, the Sri Lankan LTTE  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 This shift at Americas Watch occurred in a very politicised environment, as the organisation felt 
the need to rebut criticism of bias from the Reagan administration (Dudai & McEvoy, 2012: 8), 
and counteract the administration’s narrative presenting the FMLN and the Contras as blameless 
and respectful of the law (Goldman, 1993: 89-94).  
8 Examples of such recommendations can be found in Amnesty’s 2003 report on the DRC, On the 
Precipice (AFR 62/006/2003), in which armed groups are asked to “immediately cease unlawful 
killings and other human rights abuses against civilians” (AI, 2003b: 28) [emphasis added]; in 
Amnesty’s 2005 Iraq report, In Cold Blood (MDE 14/009/2005) in which armed groups are asked 
to “[e]nd immediately the harassment, death threats and violent attacks against women who 
exercise their rights to freedom of expression and to freedom of religion” (AI, 2005: 54) 
[emphasis added]; in HRW’s 2003 briefing paper on Aceh Under Martial Law, in which it refers 
to a war in which “both sides have violated international human rights and humanitarian law with 
impunity” (HRW, 2003: 2); and HRW’s 2005 report, No Exit, on human rights abuses carried out 
by MKO leaders against dissident members as well as some of their own members (2005b). 
 
 
	   38	  
“does not have legal obligations under ICCPR but […] remains subject to the 
demand of the international community, first expressed in the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights, that every organ of society respect and promote 
human rights” (Alston, 2006: §25).  
A few months later, a group of four Special Rapporteurs published a report concerning 
the 2006 Israel/Hezbollah war in which they used the exact same terminology to justify 
holding Hezbollah accountable to human rights norms (in Dudai & McEvoy, 2013:4). 
One of these rapporteurs was Philip Alston. We can thus see that we are presented here 
with a norm that has considerably developed and reached a good level of acceptance. 
Addressing non-state actors allows to move past the traditionally state-centric approach 
of human rights – or at least to begin to challenge it. All sorts of non-state actors are 
expected, more and more, to comply not only with principles of humanitarian law, but 
also of human rights law (Clapham, 2006: 491).  
Yet, the challenge is not absolute, as often, the language used to condemn non-
state actors is not the same as that used to address states; nor are the denunciations 
followed by the same sustained advocacy campaigns. As Petrasek puts it, in “the human 
rights universe, states are still seen as the primary, ‘legitimate target’ of human rights 
scrutiny” (2012: 133). To support this claim, he presents an interesting paradox, 
stemming from the legalistic approach of the human rights NGOs. He argues rather 
convincingly, that while these organisations need the law to support and give credence to 
their reporting, these legal rules continue to be limiting in nature. They mostly place 
obligations on governments, because only states that can sign and ratify these treaties 
(Ibid: 133). Also interesting for the purpose of this study, Petrasek analyses the discourse 
of HRW and AI. He notices that, in a sampling of public reports published between 2003 
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and 2006, on a dozen countries where armed groups were active, only about ten per cent 
of the words were devoted to abuses by armed groups (Ibid: 130). Similarly, HRW and 
AI tend to prefer the terminology of ‘abuses’ when addressing exactions committed by 
non-state actors, as technically only signatory states can commit ‘violations’. Again, this 
does not apply to reports concerning violations of IHL given that IHL can be ‘violated’ 
by any and all parties to the conflict. The highly legalistic nature of that distinction 
become apparent when we take into account the recent trend of customary international 
law, greatly diminishing the gap between the protections afforded in situations of 
international and non-international armed conflict. In fact, today, as noted by the 2005 
ICRC customary law study a large majority of basic rules on the protection of civilians 
are deemed customary in international as well as international armed conflict, and as 
such, binding to armed groups as well as states. These basic rules often find resonance 
with fundamental human rights. For example, the fundamental guarantees outlined in 
Additional Protocol I Article 75 echo almost word for word, article 14 of the ICCPR. 
Some of the fundamental guarantees found in API article 75 are reflected in rules 87 to 
93 of the ICRC customary law study and deemed customary both in international and 
non-international armed conflict (Henckaerts & Doswald-Beck, 2005). And yet, most 
international human rights NGOs persist in drawing a distinction, where non-state armed 
groups can violate their IHL obligations but can [only] commit human rights ‘abuses’. To 
some extent, this perpetuates the state-centrism it claims to challenge, as there remains a 
bias towards focusing on states (Petrasek, 2012: 134). This is all the more puzzling when 
we see that HRW’s and AI’s reporting has contributed to advancing customary IHL. In 
Endtimes of Human Rights, Hopgood cites HRW-executive director Ken Roth at length 
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on the organisations’ decision to use IHL in its work. Roth explains that HRW applied 
provision of API to internal conflicts instrumentally, “recognizing that this wasn’t 
technically right from a legal perspective” (Roth in Hopgood, 2013: 121). The goal was 
to have a set of norms “that would persuade public opinion that certain military conduct 
was wrong […], it didn’t matter whether the law technically applied or not” (Ibid). Roth 
goes on, admitting the conscious decision to participate in a positive evolution of IHL:  
“Very frequently we would use this broader principled approach to push the 
boundaries of the law, even when the law had not caught up. […] In recent years, 
international tribunals have done the same thing that we were doing at an informal 
level in 1980s.” (Ibid.) [emphasis added]. 
The impact of HRW on international jurisprudence is a subject in its own right and 
cannot be covered in the scope of this study. However, the above-cited passage speaks to 
the paradox of HRW working to extend the protections of IHL and place further 
constraints on non-state actors, while perpetuating a state-centric human rights system by 
employing different language to qualify exactions committed by states and non-state 
actors, and according disproportionate attention to state abuses and violations. 
The impact of human rights organisations’ use of IHL on international 
jurisprudence can also be seen as positively advancing the protection of civilians in 
armed conflict. The often creative and sometimes unorthodox fashion in which human 
rights organisations use IHL principles can be seen as co-opting the original IHL logic. 
Indeed, some argue that humanitarian law is originally conceived to protect the interests 
of the parties to the conflict, while human rights law protects the interests of the 
individual (Krieger, 2006: 279). If we were to accept that premise, human rights 
organisations can be said to use the IHL framework in the interest of individuals. By 
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embracing humanitarian law, the human rights community has participated in 
transforming the “standard for evaluating treatment into rights” thus conceiving of 
civilians as “having a ‘right’ to be distinguished from combatants” (Kennedy, 2004: 261). 
It has participated to giving humanitarian norms more “political authority” (Hopgood, 
2013: 121) employing IHL as it would human rights law, as a direct challenge to the 
state’s authority (Ibid.). While beyond the scope of this study, it is important to point out 
that Krieger (2006) has presented that convergence from the perspective of the ICRC 
customary law study, by analysing the [limited] results of the incorporation of human 
rights jurisprudence and reasoning to bridge the gap between the protections afforded.  
However, we can also legitimately ask whether the enthusiastic adoption of IHL 
principles and norms by human rights organisations does not indeed betray – or at least 
contradict – some principles of human rights. We have already established that the 
humanitarian law and human rights law approaches to the right to life are rather distinct, 
with IHL being much more permissive in the deprivation of life (taking the loss of 
combatant life as a given and allowing killings of civilians as collateral damage, when 
attacks pass the proportionality and precaution tests) (Andreopoulos, 2010: 229). And 
yet, while HRW systematically reiterates the applicability of human rights law in 
situations of armed conflict when setting out its legal framework, it then goes on to apply 
humanitarian norms and principles. By adopting the IHL framework, human rights 
organisations buy into the civilian/combatant dichotomy. Adopting this dichotomy has 
two far-reaching consequences. First, it logically follows that civilians are understood to 
be protected because of their civilian status. This appears to be at odds with the very core 
of human rights: affording protections to individuals on the sole basis on their humanity. 
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Second, accepting the principles of proportionality and precaution as frameworks of 
analysis renders the killing of innocent civilians permissible in certain situations. In a 
2005 HRW report on the war in Iraq, one can read: “If the destruction of a bridge is of 
paramount importance for the occupation of a strategic zone, […] it is understood that 
some houses may be hit, but not that a whole urban area be levelled”.” (HRW, 2005a: 
128). Such a statement seems quite far from human rights conceptions of the right to life, 
conceding to the destruction of ‘some houses’. As IHL is much more permissive than 
human rights law when it comes to depriving someone of their life, the question 
becomes: do these pragmatic concessions compromise human rights principles?  
Likewise, there has been a tendency for human rights reporting – and HRW and 
AI are of course no exception – to adopt the ‘moral equivalence’ approach. This 
approach, premised on the idea that all violations should be addressed according to their 
gravity, completely disregards power dynamics and/or intent in appraising a particular 
situation. Such a situation is deemed necessary for humanitarian organisations who wish 
to maintain access to the populations in need but is less intuitive for human rights 
organisations who do not have that same constraint. Bradol, giving the MSF perspective 
on the issue notes that refraining from “judging the combatants’ motives and goals can 
certainly be frustrating, but it is the price humanitarian organisations must pay if they are 
to gain access to the battlefields and assist all the victims, to whatever side they belong” 
(2004:14). Here too, the increasing reliance on the IHL ‘all parties to the conflict’ clause, 
and on humanitarian principles can be seen as having contributed to this relative ‘de-
politicisation’ of human rights. Using the South African Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission (TRC) as an example, Leebaw argues that “the focus on crimes committed 
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by all parties to the conflict functioned to divorce certain forms of extreme abuse from 
the broader political and historical context” (2007: 231). The TRC used IHL as part of the 
legal framework within which it made its findings (TRC, 1998: 597-602). In such 
situations, and in the name of ‘fairness’, an artificial equivalence is created; an 
equivalence that flattens some of the human rights considerations of morality, and power. 
In the case of South Africa, the TRC refused to differentiate state crimes from crimes 
committed against the apartheid regime (Ibid.) thus implicitly abstaining from 
condemning apartheid as a structural system of violence, and failing to address the issue 
of causation. As Cohen puts it, it creates “a convenient symmetry to disguise very 
different social realities” (1995: 35).9 A similar conclusion can be drawn from the 
increased focus on means and methods of warfare in human rights reporting. We have 
noted, notably regarding reports on Iraq, or Yemen, that both HRW and AI increasingly 
frame their investigations in relation to jus in bello and humanitarian norms. Leebaw lays 
bare the paradox in that shift, as she argues that “whereas human rights investigations are 
legitimated as a basis for moral judgment and the pursuit of justice, the humanitarian 
focus on conduct in war, or jus in bello, was historically a basis for minimizing the 
effects of war by avoiding moral judgment of political systems engaged in conflict.” 
(2007: 231). And although some of these developments must be linked back to these 
organisations’ constant fight for credibility, and an aura of impartiality, they undeniably 
narrow down human rights aspirations. Aside from the external ‘influence’ of IHL logic, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 In its final report, the South African TRC addresses some of these criticism, arguing that while 
“it was obliged by statute to deal even-handedly with all victims”, it “did not suspend moral 
judgment and drew a distinction between the actions of the state and those of the liberation 
movements” (TRC, 1998: 644§12); neither did it treat “the conflict as a conflict between equal 
parties” (Ibid: 644§14) 
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Evans observes a phenomenon endogenous to human rights: “the hegemony of law 
within human rights discourse” (2005: 1049). After having identified three overlapping 
discourses within the human rights discourse, namely “the philosophical, the legal, and 
the political” (Ibid: 1050-51); Evans argues that the domination of the legal tends act as a 
“mask” that “conceals the true causes of many human rights violations” (Ibid: 1067). 
Therefore, while the incorporation of humanitarian principles and approaches into human 
rights reporting has expanded human right organisations’ scope of action, this 
phenomenon has also come to challenge some of the foundations of human rights. 
2.2 Human rights pervading humanitarianism? 
2.2.1 Rights-based humanitarianism 
Hopgood argues that human rights norms – to what I would add, discourse – have 
colonised international humanitarianism (2011: xiv). In the previous section, we have 
seen how the two bodies of law on which theses practices are premised have converged, 
and how human rights organisations have made some IHL provision and humanitarian 
discourse theirs. By presenting and analysing these phenomena I hope to have offered a 
compelling account of one side of the convergence. Now turning to its mirror image, we 
shall study the gradual incorporation of human rights discourse and norms into 
humanitarian discourse and practice. This evolution, championed by the United Nations, 
has been, by in large resisted by the two humanitarian actors at the centre of the present 
study: Medecins Sans Frontières and the International Committee of the Red Cross.  
What is usually referred to as ‘new humanitarianism’ or ‘rights-based 
humanitarianism’, is characterised by a shift from a focus on needs to the “defence and 
fulfilment of rights” (Darcy, 2004: 4). In that new iteration of humanitarianism, 
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‘impartiality’, and mostly ‘neutrality’ seem to sit oddly with the displacement of needs by 
rights. As Hilhorst and Jansen rightfully point out, rights language “contain[s] certain 
ways of understanding society, including its organisation and the distribution of power” 
(2012: 894). Therefore, “[l]anguage – and especially its normative elements – plays an 
important role” in understanding that convergence (Ibid.).  
Rights discourse truly bloomed after the end of the cold war, seeping into “every 
nook and cranny of world affairs” (Barnett, 2011: 167). However, the first openings for 
international norm convergence in the UN context seem to date back to the late 1960s. 
Following Resolution XXIII on ‘Human Rights in Armed Conflict’ adopted at the 1968 
International Conference on Human Rights in Teheran, the UN General Assembly 
adopted resolution 2444 on the ‘Respect of human rights in armed conflict” (UNGA, 
1968). These two documents are framed in human rights terms, presented under a human 
rights heading but turn out to contain very little human rights provisions or even 
discourse, in substance. On the contrary, they principally outline principles and 
provisions of international humanitarian law for states to comply with. Since the 1990s, 
human rights have been incorporated into the work of the United Nations Security 
Council, but also into that of the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), and 
the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) (Barnett, 2011: 167). 
We can indeed see in the ‘Manual for practitioners’ on humanitarian negotiations with 
armed groups published in 2006, that OCHA not only focused on an engagement with 
non-state actors –bringing us back to a point made above– but also used the human rights 
discourse and framework extensively. There is thus considerable overlap between 
humanitarian and human rights ‘speak’ at the UN. As Darcy notes, today, a look on the 
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“virtual home of humanitarians”, ReliefWeb, suffices to show the extent to which “human 
rights and humanitarian discourses now coexist” (2004: 5). Human rights speak has thus 
rapidly “turned into one of the constituent elements of humanitarian action. Humanitarian 
crises are framed with reference to rights” (Hilhorst & Jansen, 2012: 902). The language 
of humanitarianism has been in part co-opted, reworked; to pursue human rights ends 
(Chandler, 2001: 678). 
This development of a more rights-based humanitarianism has had far-reaching 
consequences on humanitarian ethics and practice, largely redefining humanitarian 
policy. Notably, as Talal Assad argues, it has worked towards transforming a “conception 
of moral rightness into a positive right” (2015: 409). That is to say that if the objective of 
humanitarianism can be understood as the defence and restoration of human rights, we 
incur “a rearrangement of the relations among violence, ethics, and sovereignty” (Ibid.).  
Chandler in fact argues that it is this transformation of humanitarianism into a rights-
based ethic that has legitimised the “politics of international condemnation, sanctions, 
and bombings” (2001: 700), thus facilitating the “mainstreaming of rights-interventionist 
policies” (Ibid., 2002: 22-3). Focusing on the respective discourses and guidelines of the 
ICRC and MSF, we will now see how two big humanitarian players have navigated this 
convergence, engaging or not with it, embracing or rejecting the discourse of rights. 
2.2.2 ICRC’s and MSF’s relation to rights speak 
The International Committee of the Red Cross has played a major role in 
humanitarian norm formation and evolution, seen by some as having had “a monopoly on 
the definition and elaboration of humanitarian principles” until the 1990s (Leader, 1998: 
295). Since then, and in the context of convergence described above, the Geneva-based 
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institution, guardian of IHL and last bastion of Dunantism, has had to engage with the 
ubiquitous rights discourse. Its relation has tended to be one of rejection, avoiding it as 
much as possible (Darcy, 2004: 6). The fact the ICRC mission statement, in which the 
organisation’s work is described as “exclusively humanitarian” [emphasis added] 
implicitly participates in distancing the ICRC from human rights. Some humanitarian 
organisations – including the ICRC – see “a critical difference between what they do and 
what human rights organizations do” (Barnett, 2011: 16). For that reason, they spend 
considerable energy on that differentiation, as the safeguard of their humanitarian space 
is often contingent to it. As Jean Pictet famously stated, “[o]ne cannot be at one and the 
same time the champion of justice and charity. One must choose, and the ICRC has long 
since chosen to be a defender of charity” (as cited in Chandler, 2001: 695). Forsythe 
explains that the “carefully constrained” way in which the ICRC engages in public 
reporting – avoiding pointing the finger at particular actors – is premised on avoiding 
rights-discourse and ultimately dictated by the need to maintain its “major comparative 
advantage”: access (Forsythe, 2005b: 466). Making a similar point, Darcy notes that a 
humanitarian organisation like the ICRC would not feel comfortable using the traditional 
human rights advocacy vocabulary such as ‘investigate and expose’, ‘challenge’, ‘bring 
to justice’ or ‘stand with’ (2004: 9). In order to safeguard its exceptional position, the 
ICRC is often wary of being associated with human rights organisations (Ferris, 2011: 
101). As an ICRC staff member once admitted to me, some delegates take this so far that 
they try to avoid their human rights counterparts in the corridors of the UN headquarters, 
take different routes to conference rooms and make sure that they are not seen together.  
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Despite their careful avoidance of rights discourse, the ICRC continues to play a 
leading role in a crowded humanitarian field. As such, it has worked towards creating 
better coherence and cooperation between rights-based and needs-based agencies. As we 
will see in the next section, it is mostly around the concept of ‘protection’ that such 
discussions about coherence and cooperation have taken place.  
Now turning to MSF, we will see that the organisation’s relation to human rights 
has gone through various stages, embracing that discourse during a period, but partly 
distancing itself from it in recent years. In a 2000 publication entitled ‘Raising 
Awareness’, MSF says that it “sets out to alleviate human suffering, to protect life and 
health and to restore and ensure respect for human beings and their fundamental human 
rights” (MSF, 2000). Such discourse, while by no means radical or particularly 
controversial would not be imaginable in an ICRC official publication. In fact, it is 
precisely on a fundamental disagreement with the ICRC on the issue of speaking out 
against the “genocidal intentions” and “violations of human rights” by the Nigerian 
government in Biafra that rests the founding myth of MSF (Fox, 2014: 258). This duty to 
speak out, témoignage, came to hold a central place in MSF’s ethos from the late 1970s 
to the end of the 1990s. It is worth noting here that unlike what is commonly believed 
témoignage was not included in MSF’s mission from the onset.  This practice recently 
came under criticism from within the organisation, as it became clear that témoignage 
had the potential to legitimise so-called humanitarian interventions. As Weissman points 
out, “Since 2009, MSF has been more hesitant than ever to speak out on the crises in 
which it intervenes, out of fear that its words will be used to justify war or international 
criminal prosecutions, thus jeopardising its presence” (2011). Here we can clearly see 
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‘access’ and ‘speaking out’ being weighed against each other. The discourse of human 
rights is not particularly prominent in the work of MSF, but it is not avoided at all costs, 
as appears to be the case –at times– with the ICRC. Interestingly, the outcome document 
of its 1997 international reunion – also known as the Chantilly Principles, presents the 
‘defence of human rights’ as the movement’s fourth guiding principle. It states that MSF 
subscribes to:  
“the principles of human rights and humanitarian law, notably the duty to 
respect the fundamental freedoms of each individual, including the right to 
physical and mental integrity, freedom of thought, freedom of movement, 
as outlined in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 1948.” (Ibid.) 
[my own translation] 
It then goes on to mention the right to humanitarian assistance, as well as the right of 
humanitarian organisations to provide assistance in certain conditions (Ibid.). We can 
thus see a shift towards a rights discourse, and an inclusion of human rights in its guiding 
principles. 
Following Chandler’s argument, we can see that in some cases, MSF’s 
condemnations were taken to the – some would say logical – point of calling for military 
intervention. Thus, then-President Rony Brauman famously called for an intervention in 
Bosnia in 1992, when declaring on a French radio that “it’s the hills of Sarajevo that 
should be bombed” (in Binet, 2015: 42-3). And, in June 1994 MSF called for an 
intervention in Rwanda, coining the phrase “doctors and nurses cannot stop genocide” 
(Phelan, 2009: 16). Contrasting with Jean Pictet’s quote mentioned above, Alain 
Destexhe, former MSF General-Secretary argues: “humanitarian action is noble when 
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coupled with political action and justice. Without them, it is doomed to failure” (in 
Chandler, 2001: 695). 
With this in mind, it may appear unsurprising that some have described MSF as 
“the leading advocate of the new human rights humanitarianism” (Fox, 2002: 25). A 
qualification that is in fact not accurate – at least not anymore. Barnett argues that MSF’s 
initial adoption of the practice of témoignage was not necessarily connected to a broader 
human rights agenda. But by breaking with the traditional silence of humanitarians, this 
aspect of MSF’s action indubitably became its identity mark (2011: 210). In the decades 
following its creation MSF went from “being a trend-setter to being part of a pack of 
rights-bearing agencies who believed that human rights and humanitarianism were the 
same thing” (Ibid.). While rights are part of its mandate, MSF does not see itself as a 
human rights organisation, insisting in its texts, documents, and public events on the 
impartial, neutral, and independent nature of its work (Ibid.). MSF’s Nobel Lecture 
(Orbinski, 1999) is a good example of such discourse, devoting a great deal of attention 
to “the moral necessity of the humanitarian maintaining its ‘independence’ from the 
political” (Fox, 2014: 69). The lecture does not appeal to human rights as a normative 
framework to MSF’s action or as a moral compass. Contrasting with the earlier calls for 
intervention, Fabrice Weissman (Head of MSF’s think tank ‘CRASH’) published in 2010 
an article explaining the organisations decision not to support the responsibility to protect 
(R2P) doctrine (Weissman, 2010).  
Today, MSF appears to want to reconcile its principle of témoignage with the 
more ‘traditional’ humanitarianism embodied by the ICRC. In Barnett’s words, “the more 
political humanitarianism became, the more that MSF wanted to defend a ‘pure’ 
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humanitarianism that never really existed, at least not at MSF” (2011: 209). This 
endeavour proves to be rather delicate, as témoignage has come to be associated with 
rights discourse and rights-based approaches. As former President of MSF international, 
Christophe Fournier stated, “when humanitarian goals and activities are lumped together 
with this larger, broader, and more future-oriented agenda, the direct result is confusion 
and even contradiction” (as cited in Ibid: 211-12)  
2.2.3 To speak or not to speak – balancing access and public denunciation 
On today’s wildly diverse – and arguably overcrowded – humanitarian scene, 
MSF and ICRC are no small players. With activities in respectively 63 (MSF, 2015) and 
80 (ICRC, 2015) countries around the world they each provide crucial assistance on the 
ground. Their action and their history are intricately intertwined, as MSF sprung from the 
rib of ICRC in what is now considered a cornerstone of modern humanitarianism’s 
evolution: the Nigeria-Biafra conflict of 1967-70. At the source of this split was the 
dilemma around whether to speak out or stay quiet in the face of atrocities; an issue 
intricately linked to access and rights discourse. And yet, MSF’s founding charter of 
1971 did not include the principle of témoignage. As we will see below, we will have to 
wait until 1978 for the witnessing policy to be incorporated, and 1997 to see témoignage 
enshrined in the organisation’s ‘Principes de référence’. 
The ICRC’s mandate places it in an exceptional position vis-à-vis states, 
conferring it a hybrid identity somewhere between an international organisation and an 
NGO. MSF on the other hand was created [only] fifty years ago, when a collective of 
French doctors and journalists decided to come together in response to the horrors of 
Biafra. As Brauman puts it, “[s]peaking out, denouncing, standing up for victims against 
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their murderers, such was to be the thrust of the new humanitarian commitment embodied 
by MSF” (2012: 1524). This declaration has strong human rights inflections, and 
describes an approach quite different from Dunantist humanitarianism. 
In situations of intense fighting, at the height of the violence, MSF and ICRC are 
often amongst the last [international] players standing. Such situations have arisen all the 
more frequently since the early 1990s (Brauman, 2012: 1525). Thus, in situations of 
fierce fighting MSF and ICRC are often amongst the rare witnesses with direct access to 
the outside world, the power to reach out to the public and the international community. 
It is this shared exceptional position that brings the two organisations together in facing 
the dilemma of témoignage. The ICRC holds an absolute commitment to remaining in 
close proximity to the victims of armed conflict. In the words of its former President 
Jakob Kellenberger “[a]ll other considerations – with the exception of security – are 
strictly subordinated to this goal” (2004: 594). While much of MSF’s action is premised 
on proximity to the victims, it does not hold access in the same sacrosanct manner as the 
ICRC does. Darcy’s observation that “the need to maintain presence may dictate their 
chosen mode of influence” (2004:9) is still valid for both organisations, but applicable to 
different degrees. Aptly illustrating this nuance, is the example of these two 
organisations’ response to the Taliban’s position on women, in 1997 Afghanistan. While 
MSF (together with Oxfam, UNICEF and UNHCR) suspended their activities in Taliban-
controlled areas in protest of the decrees suspending women from their jobs, thus 
adopting a rights-based position defending the human rights of women; ICRC refused to 
join the movement of protest and swiftly adapted its programs to comply with the 
Taliban’s instructions and remain present (Ignatieff, 1998: 140-8). As Ignatieff 
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summarises, the ICRC “is not a human rights organization. It does not campaign against 
injustice” (Ibid: 146). While not a ‘human rights organisation’ either, MSF does see itself 
as campaigning against injustice. This imperative to maintain access often proves to be at 
odds with the use of human rights discourse and approaches. MSF and ICRC’s 
operational choices and public expressions when confronted to exactions committed 
during armed conflict appear to be decided –quite pragmatically– in the interest of 
institutional survival (Slim, 2000: 7) and continued access. 
The action of ICRC and MSF is principled. Analysing these principles and 
operational guidelines side-by-side I will attempt to show that speaking out or quietly 
working in the midst of massacre are not necessarily the two terms of a simple 
dichotomy. While impartiality and neutrality are clearly enshrined at the heart of the 
ICRC’s work philosophy, its discretion is far from absolute, upheld only in the interest of 
gaining and maintaining access to the victims. As for MSF, the myth of the ever-
loquacious French doctors placing ‘témoignage’ over all else has proven to be just that, a 
myth.  
Humanity, Impartiality, Neutrality, Independence, Voluntary Service, Unity, and 
Universality – Here are the seven fundamental principles adopted by the ICRC in 1965 
(Pictet, 1979); principles that have kept guiding the institution’s action to this day. The 
second and third principles of this list are those that have the potential of coming into 
conflict with public denunciation. Often confused, conflated or misrepresented, it is 
important to disambiguate some of these terms. Impartiality as defined by the ICRC is to 
“endeavour[] only to relieve suffering, giving priority to the most urgent cases of 
distress”, “making no discrimination as to nationality, race, religious beliefs, class or 
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political opinions” (Ibid). In other words, it represents a philosophy of action, a 
“humanitarian ethos” (Labbé, 2012: 3), and can be compared to the human rights ‘non-
discrimination’ principle. Neutrality on the other hand is the principled position to “not 
take sides in hostilities or engage at any time in controversies of a political, racial, 
religious or ideological nature” (Pictet, 1979). Impartiality is a “substantive” tenet; in 
Pictet’s terminology that is to say that it “stand[s] above all contingencies and particular 
cases […] inspire the organization and determine its acts” (Ibid). Neutrality carries a 
particular instrumental character; its core stated purpose is to enable the ICRC to “keep 
everyone’s trust […] make more contacts and gain access to those affected” (ICRC, 
2009). For Slim, this makes neutrality a “pragmatic operational posture” that allows –
some– humanitarian organisations to implement their ideals (1997: 347). Inter alia, 
neutrality manifests itself on the ground by the reluctance to publically denunciate except 
as a last resort. Neutrality thus serves impartiality. With this in mind the link to the 
dilemma of bearing witness and the tension around the increased convergence of human 
rights and humanitarian discourses become obvious. In Ignatieff’s words, for the modern 
human rights tradition, war is a moral violation “and, between the war maker and his 
victim, human rights activists cannot remain neutral.” (1998: 119). 
The ICRC thus strives to act in a neutral manner to uphold its principle of 
impartiality, but also needs to be perceived as neural in order to carry out its actions of 
humanitarian protection and assistance as thoroughly and efficiently as possible. The 
institution’s policy is one of consensual and cooperative intervention, where the ICRC 
works with the agreement of the warring parties and thus has a direct vested interest in 
maintaining a relationship of trust and entertaining an image of neutrality. In this 
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perpetual quest for access, discretion plays an active part. Bringing its concerns and 
grievances to the relevant authorities rather than the world media, the ICRC favours 
behind-the-scenes criticism – as long as the dialogue is constructive and brings about 
better protection. A policy choice reinforced by the organisation’s “special immunity 
from the obligation to testify in a court of law” first established by the International 
Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) in a ruling on the Simic case (ICTY, 
1999). In fact, recognising the unique role of the ICRC in situations of armed conflict and 
its concern to be denied access if the authorities think that the ICRC personnel might later 
testify in criminal proceedings, the court decided to exempt the ICRC from testifying, 
thus creating important jurisprudence. By contrast, it is worth noting that both HRW and 
AI published, before and after the establishment of the ICTY, a number of reports, 
naming perpetrators and demanding justice for victims of the armed conflict (AI, 1993, 
1999; HRW, 1992, 1993, 1994), and that Fred Abrahams, a HRW researcher, testified in 
front of the ICTY (ICTY, 2006). As for MSF’s approach to testifying in front of 
international tribunals, the organisation has stated publically that “international justice is 
an essential response to the trivialisation of war crimes, of crimes against humanity and 
of genocide” (in Dachy, 2004: 322) thus adopting a positive approach to justice and 
suggesting an openness to collaborate fully with the courts when confronted to such 
crimes (Ibid.). 
As Forsythe rightfully notes, “it is difficult for the ICRC to be a fully fledged 
guardian for humanitarian standards if it rarely speaks out in its favour” (Forsythe, 
2005b: 179). I am not suggesting that the institution follows a policy of strict silence; 
rather, it uses its voice with parsimony and extreme caution –arguably making its 
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intervention more impactful. The institution’s confidentiality is not without limits, but 
“proportional to the willingness of the authorities to take into account the ICRC’s 
recommendations” (ICRC, 2008: 758). In cases where dialogue does not bear fruits, the 
ICRC reserves the right to explore alternatives, public denunciation being one of them. 
Identifying “raising awareness of responsibility” as one of its “modes of action” (Ibid: 
760), the ICRC has inscribed denunciation in its policies – admittedly only when 
particular circumstances are met. ‘Denunciation’, is used only in cases where all else has 
failed, where the institution is confronted to authorities refusing to uphold or purposefully 
violate their obligations. It is worth noting that the ICRC has also used that tool when its 
findings and recommendations are misrepresented by the authorities.10 Even when such a 
decision to publicly denounce is taken, it is further governed by a set of conditions. There 
is thus a window for the ICRC to engage in public denunciation - a narrow, well-guarded 
window but a window no less. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 In situations where authorities publish a truncated version of an ICRC report, giving the 
impression that all is for the best in the best of all possible worlds, the ICRC will typically 
address the situations by making available the complete report. As then-deputy Director of 
Operations Dominik Stillhart notes, “if a detaining authority issues excerpts from one of our 
confidential reports – without our consent – we reserve the right to publish the entire report in 
order to prevent any inaccurate or incomplete interpretations of our observations and 
recommendations” (Stillhart, 2010). Furthermore, the November 2004 controversy around a 
leaked ICRC report on Guantanamo gives insight into the institution’s cautions approach to 
public denunciation. On November 30, 2004, the New York Times leaked the ICRC report (NYT, 
2004). In that same article, the NYT cited General Hood, the commander of the Gitmo detention 
and interrogation facility saying “I’m satisfied that the detainees here have not been abused, 
they’ve not been mistreated, they’ve not been tortured in any way” (Ibid.). On that very same day, 
the ICRC issued a News Release in which it refused to “publicly confirm or deny whether the 
quotations in the article […] reflect findings reported by the ICRC” (ICRC, 2004). However, it 
declared that it remained “concerned that significant problems regarding conditions and treatment 
at Guantanamo Bay have not yet been adequately addressed” (Ibid.). This particular sentence can 
be seen as the ICRC taking on the Bush Administration for its repeated misrepresentation of 
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MSF’s founding charter, written in 1971 directly echoes a number of Dunantist 
principles and, somehow surprisingly, does not mention a duty of témoignage, but does 
enumerate “neutrality, “impartiality” and “independence” as founding principles (MSF, 
1971), thus bearing resemblance with the founding principles of the ICRC (Darcy, 2004). 
It appeals to universal medical ethics and the right to humanitarian assistance for moral 
grounding (MSF, 1971). Thus, while choosing to formulate humanitarian assistance as a 
‘right’, the charter does not reference ‘human rights’. As Brauman notes, the charter 
affirmed that MSF staff must “refrain from passing judgement or publicly expressing an 
opinion – favourable or unfavourable – with regard to events and to the forces and 
leaders that accept their aid” (Brauman, 2012: 1526). This initial document thus gave 
priority to ensuring access, upholding the principles of neutrality and impartiality over 
that of ‘témoignage’, thus silencing those who had found the ICRC too quiet in Biafra 
(Phelan, 2009: 4). 
 Only six years later was this confidentiality commitment broken. As Claude 
Malhuret returned to France after a mission on the Thai border he condemned, on the 
country’s main TV station the crimes committed by the Khmer regime. This rogue act led 
to tumultuous debate among the MSF staff and directors in Paris. Eventually, in 1978 
Malhuret – who had by then been elected President of the movement – announced a 
reform of the witnessing policy. From then on, MSF staff would report “human rights 
violations and unacceptable events they witnessed to the bureau” [emphasis added] that 
would then “make an executive decision on whether to inform the public, in cases where 
MSF was the sole witness” (in Weissman, 2011). These guidelines depart from the 
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founding charter, notably by explicitly bringing ‘human rights violations’ under the scope 
of action of MSF. 
 In the ‘Principes de référence du movement’ of 1997, commonly known as the 
Chantilly principles, MSF reaffirmed its duty of witness (Phelan, 2009: 17). These 
principles, still guiding MSF’s action today, present medical action as the utmost priority 
of the movement, the first principle. Témoignage comes second, presented as the 
inseparable and integral complement to medical action (MSF, 1997). The association of 
témoignage with the impartiality principle has been described by some to create an 
‘active impartiality’ characterised by speaking out and condemning any party (Slim, 
1997: 349) – reminiscent of Amnesty’s conception of that same principle.11 Principle 
seven, ‘un esprit de neutralité’ outlines the conditions under which MSF can abandon the 
strict observance of neutrality to mobilise public opinion and try to stop massive human 
rights violations. ‘Neutrality’ thus appears to have undergone a downgrade, from absolute 
principle to guiding spirit, operational tool. Here, access is not an end in itself but 
something that is sought if and when it is the most effective way to better a humanitarian 
–and human rights– situation.  
In 2006, after a two-year-long consultation process, MSF adopted a document 
aimed “to better define the basic raison d’être of MSF, its roles and limitations” (Fox, 
2014: 101). Known as the La Mancha Agreement, this document notably states that while 
MSF actions “coincide with some of the goals of human rights organizations”. Their goal 
is medical-humanitarian action, and not “the promotion of such rights” (MSF, 2006: 4). 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 For Amnesty, ‘impartiality’ means that it should “work for victims of human rights violations 
regardless of the ideologies of governments or the views of victims” (IEC subcommittee as cited 
in Hopgood, 2006: 97). But it is also co-dependent with the idea of a certain balance in 
condemnation both across and within contexts. 
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Here we can see a will for MSF to differentiate itself from human rights organisations, 
but also from some humanitarian organisations that have come to fully embrace human 
rights as both an ethic and a guiding framework. As Hopgood argues, “in a world that is 
all about profane politics, making credible claims to be impartial becomes both harder 
and more valuable.” (Hopgood, 2013: 168) 
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III. ‘Protection’ in human rights and humanitarianism 
discourse 
 
1. ‘Protection’, a central concept in the convergence 
Originally, and until the 1990s, ‘protection’ was understood to primarily refer to 
legal activities and had relatively more limited application in humanitarian and human 
rights circles. Protection activities were mostly restricted to the ICRC and the United 
Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) – both mandated with such 
activities international conventions. Strikingly, UN resolution 44/182 (UNGA, 1991), 
pivotal in the evolution of the UN’s humanitarian policy, does not mention the term 
‘protection’ at all (Slim, 2004: 154). And yet, that term went on to shape the greatest 
strategic challenge faced by international humanitarianism and human rights through the 
1990s. As Slim notes, in just over 10 years, “protecting the human rights of civilians in 
armed conflict” became a major concern for international humanitarianism (Ibid: 158). 
Furthermore, today, and since 1999, the mandate of the “protection of civilians” is 
consistently provided to UN peacekeeping missions (Willmot & Sheeran, 2013: 521) 
Through the 1990s, the use of term ‘protection’ surged, within and beyond the 
walls of the UN. For example, on average, ICRC annual reports contained more than 
twice as many times the term ‘protection’ between 2010 and 2014 than between 1990 and 
1994 [numbers accounting for the lengthier reports in more recent years]. A similarly –
yet less stark– phenomenon can be observed in Amnesty International’s annual reports 
for that same period. 12 Plethora of actors joined the field of action and of discourse. Its 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12 Between 1990 and 1994 (included), the word ‘protection’ appeared, on average, 0.43 times per 
page. Between 2010 and 2014, that same word appeared on average 0.95 times per page. As for 
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meaning was inexorably expanded, making it describe virtually all forms of action in 
support of civilians in war (Ibid: 159). This spreading and re-definition of ‘protection’ in 
NGO consciousness is, furthermore, a sign of the impact of human rights on the discourse 
and practice of humanitarianism (Slim, 2001: 19). As Sergio Vieira De Mello – former 
UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, and Special Representative to Iraq killed in 
Baghdad in 2003 – writes, “[t]he concept of protection inextricably links human rights 
and humanitarian action” (2004: 171). In a similar vein, Ferris argues that today, “the 
issue of protecting people, at least among humanitarians, is framed largely in the 
language of human rights” (2011: 40). Thus I contend that the way ‘protection’ has been 
defined, interpreted, implemented is central to the rapprochement between human rights 
and humanitarianism. For not only is today’s discourse of ‘protection’ a result of that 
convergence; it has also actively contributed to it, even partly constituted it. I will thus 
endeavour to analyse how some of the “networks of usage, reference and perspective” 
(Williams, 1985: 23) have developed, around this concept. 
It is interesting to note, that mappings of the convergence of human rights and 
humanitarianism, and mappings of the evolution of ‘protection’ discourse in these fields 
often have very similar timelines, and identify the same trigger-events. In fact, the wide 
body of scholarship about the convergence tends to point to the end of the Cold War as 
the pivotal point, and to the crises in Bosnia and Rwanda as symptomatic of the broader 
crisis of ‘traditional humanitarianism’, prompting the incorporation of a rights-based 
approach (Slim, Barnett). In parallel, we can see that the body of scholarship studying the 
evolution of protection discourse appears to draw a very similar timeline and point to the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Amnesty International, for these same periods, the occurrence of the term ‘protection’ was 
respectively of 0.22 and 0.36 times per page (see Annexes 1 and 2). 
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same trigger moments. For example, in The Politics of Protection (2011) Elizabeth Ferris 
maps the evolution of that concept identifying the 1990s as the key decade, and 
“widespread bloodshed in Somalia, Bosnia, and Rwanda” as triggers pushing 
humanitarians to rethink their approach to ‘protection’ (Ferris, 2011: xi). The shift to 
rights in humanitarian discourse and action and the evolution of protection discourse thus 
seems inextricably intertwined.  
2. Coming to ‘terms’ with protection  
Despite the recent surge in its usage, the concept of ‘protection’ remains a 
contested term, and that contestation has crucial significance when attempting to 
understand the converging tendencies of human rights and humanitarianism. In this 
section, we shall briefly explore the different understandings of protection and present the 
concerted efforts to consolidate and homogenise these understandings. This lack of 
clarity on what exactly is meant by ‘protection’, and on what activities it includes, has 
raised coherence and complementarity challenges (Willmot & Sheeran, 2013). As such, 
the concept of ‘protection’ epitomises the tensions brought about by the convergence 
between the discourses of human rights and humanitarianism. Borrowing from Raymond 
Williams, we can say that different actors “just don’t speak the same language”. While 
they use the same word, ‘protection’ and while none of them is “‘wrong’ by any 
linguistic criterion,” they have “different immediate values or different kinds of 
valuations”; they “are aware, often intangibly, of different formations and distributions of 
energy and interest” (Willams, 1985: 11). Extensively used – and misused – in the fields 
of human rights and humanitarianism (Howen, 2007), the term ‘protection’ tends to be 
used by default, to describe any and every human rights and humanitarian activity. Marc 
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DuBois has wittily described protection as the ‘new humanitarian fig-leaf’ (2010). From 
a rather pessimistic perspective, he argues that the humanitarian community has built, 
with “enthusiastic support from major donors”, a “protection bureaucracy” that has made 
protection the focal issue in any given emergency (Ibid: 2-3). Today, human rights and 
humanitarian NGOs, many UN agencies, and civil society organisations (CSOs) carry out 
protection activities targeted at civilians in situations of armed conflict. Due to the lack of 
strategic coherence and the absence of concerted political action, each set of actors seems 
to frame different narratives of protection and have different conceptions of what it 
entails practically and programmatically (Willmot & Sheeran, 2013: 517). Activities 
branded as ‘protection of civilians in armed conflict’ have included – but have not been 
limited to: human rights monitoring, advocacy, reporting, humanitarian mediation, aid 
distribution, social, economic and legal support, and military intervention (Ibid: 518). 
The lumping together of such diverse and at times conflicting activities under the banner 
of ‘protection’ has created confusions. Confusions that were notably laid bare in 2011, 
when the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) authorised the NATO-led 
intervention in Libya under the declared objective to “protect civilians and civilian 
populated areas under the threat of attack” (UNSC, 2011: §4). It is safe to assume, on the 
basis of what followed, that the ins and outs of ‘protection of civilians’ there differed 
from a traditional human rights – or humanitarian – conception of that same term.  
This complex and crowded discursive field reflects the need to proceed with great 
caution when analysing the various actors present and their respective activities. First, the 
concept of ‘protection’ is at the root of both IHL and IHRL. A point worth making as the 
two discourses and practices under study here take root, as we have established, in these 
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respective bodies of law. As Ferris notes, the concept of protection was central to the 
development of IHL as each of the Geneva Convention, and its Additional Protocols 
gradually extended protections to particular population – first to the wounded and sick on 
the battlefield (GCI), the wounded and sick at sea (GCII), prisoners of war (GCIII), 
civilians in international armed conflict (GCIV and API), and finally civilians in non-
international armed conflict (APII). In fact, while the first three conventions used the 
language of “amelioration of the conditions of” (GCI and II) or “relative to the treatment 
of” (GCIII) in their title, GCIV and both Additional Protocols preferred “relative” or 
“relating to” the “protection of” [emphasis added]. In War and Law since 1945, Geoffrey 
Best also argues that the fourth Geneva Convention represented an important shift in that 
it extended ‘protection’ to a population for which it is much more difficult to ‘deliver’. 
Here it is worth quoting Best at length:  
“The same word [protection] is used in relation to wounded, sick, and shipwrecked 
combatants and to combatants who have been taken prisoner, and in those 
connections makes good enough sense, as it does also in respect of enemy (or 
‘occupied’) civilians who have been interned. In those contexts it is realistically 
achievable and it has a moral integrity which is not so apparent in its other uses. 
But civilians at large, civilians in general: how far can they actually enjoy the 
protection it promises must largely depend, as it always has done, on 
circumstances, politics, personalities, accident, luck, and so on; things which the 
soldier never forgets, but which the civilian hardly ever remembers” (1994: 256). 
This “protective enthusiasm”, with a certain ‘human rights’ inflexion thus carries the risk 
of ultimately making protection unachievable. For Best, protection should thus be 
understood “in relative terms” (Ibid: 257).  
We can note here that unlike the preceding conventions, GCIV was drafted after 
World War II, contemporaneously to the UDHR, at a time when human rights were in the 
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air. In fact most legal scholars and historians refute Krieger’s argument that “the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 1948 and the 1949 Geneva Conventions were 
separately drafted without taking account of one another” (2006: 267). Hitchcock notes 
that a detailed historical analysis of the Geneva Conventions of 1949 “reveals a critical 
link between the laws of war and human rights” (2012: 95). And Best, also looking at the 
legislative history, makes the point that the delegates in Geneva knew very well what had 
happened in 1948 with both the Genocide Convention and the United Nations Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) (Best, 1994: 70-79). The UDHR, precisely, refers 
to ‘protection’ ten times (Ferris, 2011: 3). The Declaration sets out basic protections to 
which all individuals have a right; protections that would then be set out in more detail, 
sometimes for particular groups, in the subsequent human rights treaties. For Ferris, 
“much of the modern human rights movement is about expanding the scope of 
protection” (Ibid). Thus IHRL and IHL pursue the same objective, “seeking the 
protection of the same people at the same time from the same sort of armed abuse” (Best, 
1994: 69). But when ‘protection’ is not always taken to mean the same thing, or to 
translate into the same activities, coherence and complementarity become paramount. 
2.1  Efforts to create a shared definition 
There have been, however, a series of concerted efforts to address this confusion 
and get closer to a common understanding of protection. Such efforts, spearheaded by the 
ICRC, are paramount to creating an environment more conducive to the protection of 
civilians in armed conflict. This norm entrepreneurship materialised in a series of 
workshops held at the organisation’s headquarters in Geneva, between 1996 and 2000. 
According to ICRC’s Danielle Coquoz, this initiative sprung from the lack of discussion 
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between human rights and humanitarian organisations on their respective practices in 
helping the victims (2004: 178-79). It is in response to that gap that the ICRC decided to 
convene a meeting between representatives of “humanitarian and human rights 
organisations, to explore a concept of protection […] to talk over differing practices and 
compare similar ones – or at least achieve a better understanding of the way their 
organisations work” (Ibid.). Bringing together these different actors to promote shared 
principles and improve the level of professionalism and effectiveness, these working 
groups eventually produced the following definition of protection: 
“all activities aimed at ensuring full respect for the rights of the individual in 
accordance with the letter and the spirit of the relevant bodies of law, i.e. human 
rights law, international humanitarian law, and refugee law. Human rights and 
humanitarian organizations must conduct these activities in an impartial manner (not 
on the basis of race, national or ethnic origin, language or gender)” (in Caverzasio, 
2001). 
This very broad definition identifies IHL, IHRL and refugee law as relevant normative 
frameworks for protection activities.13 It reiterates the centrality of the principle of 
impartiality but does not posit that protection activities must exclusively be carried out by 
neutral actors, on the contrary. Most importantly for our purposes, the definition is rights-
based. Quite surprisingly, the ICRC itself sees that definition as having “helped to 
establish a greater understanding between humanitarian and human rights actors, and 
prompted the former to increasingly adopt a rights-based approach” (ICRC, 2013a: 12). 
This statement, apparently welcoming the increased adoption of a rights-based approach 
by humanitarians seems to be at odds with the institution’s traditional reluctance with 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13 While the inclusions of refugee law/refugee protection perspectives would be interesting and 
valuable, this study being primarily about the convergence of human rights and humanitarianism, 
I have taken the decision to exclude these perspectives. 
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regards to rights-talk. Hopgood notes this paradox when he writes that the ICRC 
contributed to creating a human rights based definition of protection when it has itself 
“survived precisely by not speaking out about human rights” (2013: 168) [emphasis in 
original]. Furthermore, the ICRC’s statement reinforces the centrality of ‘protection’ in 
understanding the dynamics of the convergence of human rights and humanitarianism. 
Rapidly, this norm cascaded, with the Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC), 
UN agencies, Red Cross/Crescent societies and NGOs taking it on as the standard 
definition of protection (Ferris, 2011: 17). The adoption of that terminology by the UN 
system, which plays a central role in humanitarian norm evolution, has undeniably 
contributed to the term’s prominence in humanitarian discourse. Beyond defining the 
concept, this initiative also outlined three types of activities that make up the protection 
framework (commonly referred to as ‘the egg framework’): responsive action, remedial 
action, and environment-building action (Ibid). These discussions around protection were 
folded into the Sphere Project initiative (1997-2011) that sought to develop a 
humanitarian charter and protection principles, setting minimum standards for actors in 
the field. Culminating in the publication of a ‘handbook’, first published in 2000 and re-
edited in 2004 and 2011, the Sphere Project also divided protection into three areas of 
action: preventive, responsive, and remedial (Sphere Project, 2011: 32). As we 
understand ‘environment-building’ activities to be of primarily ‘preventive’ nature, the 
two frameworks are considered essentially identical. These three sets of activities are not 
intended as a chronological sequence of actions but rather can be carried out 
simultaneously as well as sequentially (Hoven, 2007: 40). By conceiving of protection as 
translating into such a broad set of activities, to be carried out across temporalities, this 
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framework clearly reaches beyond ‘emergency humanitarianism’ – and arguably 
challenges some of the central tenets of humanitarianism at large.  
The ‘Humanitarian Charter’ contained in the Sphere handbook is “an explicit call 
to a rights-based humanitarianism” (Slim, 2001: 18), notably as it associates human rights 
techniques such as “violations monitoring, accompaniment and presence” to more 
“traditional humanitarian assistance work” (Slim, 2004: 161). Furthermore, it presents the 
three core humanitarian principles as being “the right to life with dignity, distinction 
between combatants and non-combatants, and the refugee principle of non-refoulement” 
(Ibid.). Humanitarian work is thus defined in terms of humanitarian law but also of 
human rights law and refugee law; directly echoing the conception of protection 
presented above, rooted in these three same bodies of law. This suggests that by 
(re)defining ‘protection,’ a concept so central to both humanitarianism and human rights, 
these successive initiatives indeed participated in unsettling humanitarianism’s 
foundations, challenging our understanding of it. In that human rights-infused definition, 
with added justice-oriented inflexions, the “urgency of need is no longer the sole 
consideration in setting the agenda” (Leebaw, 2007: 228). 
In that context, the questions of “means rather than ends,” of “strategy and 
complementarity of action” are crucial (Darcy, 2004: 3). The definition provided above is 
indeed far too broad and all encompassing to offer any operational guidance. Addressing 
Darcy’s comments, The Overseas Development Institute’s (ODI) Active Learning 
Network on Accountability and Performance (ALNAP) produced a protection “guide for 
humanitarian agencies” [emphasis added] in 2005 (Slim & Bonwick, 2005). In that 
document, the ODI presented protection with “an emphasis on safety, personal dignity, 
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integrity and empowerment,” understood “in terms of rights” (Ibid: 33). But more 
importantly, it set out to “identify the key elements of basic programming that enable 
agencies to be more protection-focused in their work,” and “alert agencies to the risk of 
pursuing protection objectives” (Ibid: 15). With the declared goal of operationalising 
protection, the ODI thus offered important insight into what activities are commonly 
understood as ‘protection,’ and helped us better understand some tensions susceptible to 
arise from a broadly defined –rights-based– protection. Adopting the ‘egg framework’ the 
document then presented five “modes of action”: denunciation, mobilisation, persuasion, 
capacity building, and substitution (Ibid: 83). By using this model, it reaffirms its 
conception of humanitarian action as rights-based, acting much beyond its traditionally 
defined boundaries. The now widely accepted definition of protection is thus very broad.  
As such, it allows for enough leeway for individual protection actors to elaborate their 
own distinct definitions, within that overarching framework. Turning now to some of the 
more targeted and specific conceptions of that term, we will notably look at the ICRC’s 
conception of protection and the impact its reframing has had on the organisation’s 
discourse and action. As the ICRC is often construed as the ultimate bastion of 
‘traditional’ humanitarianism, it is particularly interesting to see how the Geneva 
institution acted, and reacted in the face of these evolutions. 
2.2  Right-based ‘protection’ for all? 
We have thus seen that protection has been used more and more by an 
exponentially growing number of actors. This surge in use happened simultaneously –and 
was arguably encouraged by– initiatives to elaborate a consensual definition of the 
concept, enacting a rapprochement between human rights and humanitarian actors. But 
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under this umbrella definition, “differences in approaches and aspirations still exist” 
(ICRC, 2013a: 11).  
Unlike the ICRC and MSF, Amnesty and HRW are not organised to meet a need 
or provide a service (Hopgood, 2006: 7). They have researchers on the ground but 
beyond that research, they do not carry out field activities. Human rights activism can –in 
some situations– be effectively carried out at a distance and is thus not premised on 
access in the same way that humanitarian action is. This distinction is important when we 
come to think of their conception of the ‘protection’. As Wilmot and Sheeran note, the 
‘protection of civilians’ concept is “somewhat superfluous” from a human rights 
perspective, since the human rights framework “underwrites a general concept and 
specific aspects of the protection of individuals through respect for the wide spectrum of 
human rights” (2013: 533). In line with the traditional human rights understanding 
presented in the respect-protect-remedy framework (Ruggie, 2008), these organisations 
also see protection obligations as falling primarily on states (and increasingly, non-state 
actors exerting a certain power over particular areas or populations). That is to say that 
human rights organisations do not to carry out protection-of-persons activities per se, 
rather some of their action is often conceived as working toward the protection and 
promotion of IHRL (Willmot & Sheeran, 2013: 533), notably by calling on –primarily 
state– entities to ensure the protection of particular populations. Human rights monitoring 
and reporting, advocacy, and efforts to ensure accountability for international human 
rights violations are examples of such ‘protection-related’ activities (Ibid.). 
Interestingly, MSF makes much less use of the term ‘protection’ – totally absent 
from the ‘About MSF’ section of its international website as well as from its Charter and 
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principles. This can be explained in part by MSF’s quite different relation to the law –be 
it human rights or humanitarian law. We have in fact seen that ‘protection’ largely 
appeals to legal obligations under human rights, humanitarian, and refugee law. MSF is, 
as we know, a non-mandated organization. As such it has had more liberty in shaping its 
relationship to it. As Bradol notes, MSF’s appeal to law has been used to “exert pressure 
on political authority” as a means “of staving off suffering and death”. But far from a 
systematic approach, he argues that MSF’s use of the law has been, and “must remain”, 
“purely opportunistic” (2004: 7). Far from providing the absolute and definitive 
explanation of MSF’s more timid use of ‘protection’, this observation gives it some 
context and helps us understand some of the dynamics at play. 
The ICRC has its own definition of that concept, a definition that has also 
incorporated rights inflexions in recent years. The institutional definition of the concept is 
one that gives the ICRC mostly indirect protective duties. In other words, the ICRC itself 
is not seen as directly ‘protecting’ populations; rather, its role is to ensure that 
“authorities and other constituted groups comply with their obligations” under IHL and 
other relevant bodies of law (ICRC, 2010). Thus ICRC protection is originally comprised 
of those efforts to prevent, avoid the recurrence of, and put a stop to actual or potential 
violations (ICRC, 2012: 46). Traditionally, the ICRC presents its activity as divided into 
two categories: assistance, and protection. A dichotomy that, as Leader noted back in 
1998, gained prominence among humanitarian actors: “the responsibility to promote 
protection as well as assistance is beginning to be recognised by most serious agencies. 
[…] Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) has also worked to bring the two constituencies 
together” (Leader, 1998: 296). ICRC publications usually present protection as mostly 
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pertaining to detention visits (Forsythe, 2005a: 167). But gradually, as the concept of 
protection gained prominence, pervading the discourse –notably through the ‘protection 
of civilians’ terminology– this dichotomy has lost some of its rigidity. As Slim notes, 
many activities traditionally labelled ‘relief’, and subsequently ‘assistance’, have now 
been repackaged as “humanitarian protection” (2001: 19). Today, the ICRC refers to 
‘protection’ both as separate from assistance and as including certain forms of assistance 
(Forsythe, 2005a: 92), which can lead to some confusion. In the strictest sense, protection 
refers specifically to the efforts concerned with preventing, stopping and avoiding 
recurrence of violations of IHL and other bodies of law and normative standards that 
protect people at risk. In the broad sense, it is seen as a process that combines actions 
related to the causes of violations with actions that aim to alleviate the resultant suffering. 
Thus if assistance is provided in a certain fashion, actively participating in re-building 
capacity, strengthening resilience, and allowing the populations to remain in relatively 
safe areas, it can arguably be considered to participate in their ‘protection’. Protection 
activities concern themselves with –and address– specific threats; assistance activities do 
not necessarily do so. For the ICRC, assistance work is intrinsically linked to and 
inseparable from protection (ICRC, 2008), but the two cannot be collapsed into each 
other.  
As we have seen, the ICRC has been a leader on initiatives for the development of 
the definition of protection, and for the subsequent operationalisation of that definition. 
Most notably, in 2009 and 2013, the institution published ‘Professional standards for 
protection work carried out by humanitarian and human rights actors in armed conflict 
and other situations of violence’ (2013a). In that document the ICRC openly uses the 
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language of rights in describing protection work. While the use of such terminology is 
not necessarily inconsistent with the organisation’s principle and modus operandi, it is 
uncommon enough to be noted. Recognising the potentially “positive synergies” brought 
about by the simultaneous presence of human rights and humanitarian actors on the 
protection field, the document expresses the “conviction that there is enough common 
ground to establish a firm, shared basis” for protection work (Ibid: 11). Further, 
protection actors are encouraged to “prefer a longer-term strategy that builds on the 
capacity of affected populations to organize themselves, and engages the authorities at all 
levels, to see their rights respected.” (Ibid: 28). This formulation is interesting in that IHL 
(from which, as we know, the ICRC gets its mandate) is not usually understood to be a 
body of law outlining rights for individuals, but obligations for belligerents. It thus 
suggests that protection work should appeal to other bodies of law, notably human rights 
law. In that sense, following Leader, we can see that in a way, a notion of 
humanitarianism that includes protection is bound to be, in certain respects, “rights-
based” (Leader, 1998: 298).  
 For assistance activities to be fully recast as protection [according to the master 
definition] they need to be reconceptualised as ensuring basic rights, rather than (just) 
responding to essential needs. Such a ‘repackaging’ carries some risk. If done 
uncritically, without a deeper questioning of the impact of certain forms of assistance, it 
carries the risk of being nothing more than a renaming, a rebranding, limited to a question 
of semantics. The advent of protection-speak cannot bring about an automatic relabeling 
of all assistance activities as ‘protection’. As Dubois writes, we would risk falling into the 
absurd situation where “a blanket takes on the garb of protection work”; where 
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“distributing sacks of corn flour equates to protecting people’s right to food.” (2010: 3). 
One of the consequences would be a false sense of security for the victims, and of 
achievement for the donors and the general public. He continues: “[l]imited risk 
reduction or raising awareness should not be branded ‘protection’ activities when we 
know the word conveys so much more to the public” (Ibid: 4). While there has been some 
“semantic manoeuvring” (Slim, as cited in Fox, 2002: 24) around the concept of 
protection, notably by the instillation of a more rights-based understanding; it is 
encouraging to see that ‘protection’ has also become a rallying cry for humanitarian and 
human rights organisations. Discussions around ‘protection’ (Sphere Project 2011; Slim 
& Bonwick 2005; ICRC 2013a) have brought about important developments for further 
coherence, collaboration and complementarity. 
3. Some (other) implications of the rebranding of ‘protection’ 
Because protection remains so broadly defined, it can arguably be made to 
encompass some activities potentially detrimental to the very populations it is set out to 
protect. For example, with ‘denunciation’ and ‘mobilisation’ identified as ‘modes of 
action’ by the ALNAP guidebook, we can easily imagine a situation where forceful 
advocacy may constitute a great risk to the humanitarian access to people in crisis 
(Dubois, 2010). This brings us to the obvious but crucial need for a careful analysis of 
potential backlash. But even with the best practice in the world, there remains contexts 
where humanitarian – or human rights – organisations “no longer control the meaning of 
their protection activities as interpreted by those with power, guns or blood [on] their 
hands” (Ibid). Discourse – taking Foucault’s conception of it as encompassing more than 
language – is never limited to the creation of meaning. It necessarily extends into the 
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process of communication, during which the meaning is always interpreted; an 
interpretation not always aligned with intention. Thus, as ‘protection’ remains that 
overarching umbrella under which numberless actors can congregate and elaborate 
extremely diverse strategies, we incur the risk of seeing two protection activities proving 
to be mutually detrimental. 
 3.1 From ‘humanitarian intervention’ to Responsibility to Protect 
The ‘Responsibility to Protect’ framework and doctrine epitomise some of the 
potential outcomes of such a broad definition of protection and the subsequent 
divergences. By perpetuating the idea of ‘humanitarian’ intervention [terminology that 
already co-opted the idea of ‘humanitarianism’], and justifying it in terms of human 
rights, it stands out as a product of the convergence between human rights and 
humanitarianism; a product of the ubiquity and vagueness of protection discourse. By 
mapping the discursive journey from ‘humanitarian intervention’ to the ‘Responsibility to 
Protect’ doctrine the present section will argue that the shift in discourse has failed to 
engage in a deep reassessment of the relation between humanitarianism and intervention, 
and instead has merely rebranded the problem through the discourse of ‘protection’. This 
phenomenon has played a central role in framing the meaning of ‘protection’ at the 
United Nations, and beyond. It has also “enabled the interveners to use human protection-
related arguments to justify policies and practices that have nothing, or little, to do with 
human protection advocacy” (Andreopoulos & Lantsman, 2010: 85) 
In its final report, published in December of 2001, the International Commission 
on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) laid the foundations for R2P, rooting this 
doctrine in a redefinition of sovereignty as conditional to the state’s responsibility to 
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protect its people. From there, R2P is made of a continuum of duties for individual states 
as well as for the international community, ranging from prevention to rebuilding. It thus 
broadens the scope of what was commonly understood as intervention. However, it has 
kept at its crux the responsibility to intervene militarily for humanitarian purposes 
(Massingham, 2009: 815). In fact, no further than in the foreword’s first phrase, the 
project is described as being about “the so-called ‘right of humanitarian 
intervention’”(ICISS, 2001: vii), seeking to answer the  “question of when, if ever, it is 
appropriate for states to take coercive […] action” (Ibid.) for the purpose of human 
protection. Wary of the heavy baggage that the term ‘humanitarian intervention’ carried, 
the ICISS engaged in an important shift in terminology. This shift intended to address 
two concerns. On the one hand, that of humanitarian organisations worried about the 
militarisation of humanitarianism; on the other, the concern that using “an inherently 
approving word like ‘humanitarian’” would “prejudge the very question” (Ibid: 9) of 
legitimacy. As a result, the term “military intervention for human protection purposes” 
(Ibid.) [emphasis added] was preferred. This reformulation attempted to decouple 
‘intervention for human protection purposes’ from ‘humanitarianism’, thus seeking to 
move beyond the ‘humanitarian intervention’ debate (Weiss, 2014: 10) 
The United Nations (UN) has internalised R2P through a series of debates and 
discussions, resolution 60/1 of 2005 being the first official UN document to outline the 
organisation’s understanding of this doctrine. Following up with the ICISS’ works, the 
UN successfully abandoned the language of ‘humanitarian intervention’, preferring that 
of  “timely and decisive” “collective action” for the protection of civilians or populations 
from “genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity” (UN 2005, 
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2009). This change in terminology appears to reformulate rather than rethink a 
problematic concept. In his 2009 report on the implementation of R2P, the Secretary 
General defended the abandonment of ‘humanitarian intervention,’ arguing that the 
concept posed a “false choice between two extremes” (UN, 2009: §7). As the UN’s 
version of R2P focuses on preventive efforts (Pommier, 2011: 1066) it is arguably 
“deep[er]” (Ibid: §10c) than the notion it has replaced and offers a guide to manoeuvre 
space between those two extremes. But in certain specific cases where this in-between 
has been attempted, R2P does call for timely and decisive intervention – military if 
necessary (UN, 2009: §56) – bringing us back to that same predicament. The most recent 
report of the Secretary General on R2P (UNSG, 2014) focuses solely on capacity 
building and prevention, ignoring the potential for military action. Turning away from the 
contentions will not make them disappear. As Andreopoulos and Lantsman simply put it, 
“the doctrine of HI is ‘alive and well’ and it is conditioning the prospects for 
operationalizing R2P” (2010: 85). 
3.2 ‘Protection of civilians’ and the spectre of a resilient amalgam 
 The ICISS and the UN have brought about a change in semantics by virtually 
banning the expression ‘humanitarian intervention’. This shift in discourse allowed them 
to bypass the debate on the oxymoronic nature of the concept, by dropping the explicit 
claim of humanitarianism. Dropping the terminology allowed R2P to do away with this 
principled straightjacket. However, the preferred semantics of ‘intervention for the 
protection of civilians’ has dragged with it the tensions that ‘humanitarian intervention’ 
had created in its time. 
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The 2011 intervention in Libya is a particularly fitting illustration of this point. 
Resolution 1973 (UN, 2011) by which the intervention was authorised explicitly refers to 
the “responsibility…to protect” and grounds its legitimacy in the response to what “may 
amount to crimes against humanity”14 (Ibid.). Perhaps most importantly, the resolution 
allows military intervention “to protect civilians” (Ibid: §4). This intervention was 
therefore a case in which the use of military force was legalised, invoking the 
responsibility to protect. 
As we have seen, ‘protection of civilians’ is a concept now deeply rooted in 
humanitarian discourse. From this perspective, what is at stake is how to best protect 
civilians in times of conflict. As used in reference to the 2011 intervention in Libya, 
‘protection of civilians’ was rooted in political interpretations, justified in human rights 
terms, and posed the question of when it would be legitimate to go to war. Thus while in 
the first instance ‘civilian protection’ is about the means and practices of warfare (jus in 
bello) in the second one, it is about a legitimate reason to go to war (jus ad bellum) 
(Pommier, 2011: 1073). The conflation of these two ideas under a single denomination 
has recreated a dangerous confusion between the humanitarian, human rights, and the 
politico-military agendas of the actors involved (Daccord, 2011; Pommier, 2011). 
Furthermore, the tensions identified earlier with regards to ‘protection’ logically find 
themselves transposed in the R2P framework.  Bronwyn Leebaw sums up this tension 
when she writes:  
“Contemporary formulations of humanitarian intervention fuse the urgency and 
immediacy of humanitarian rescue with the justice claims associated with human 
rights. At the same time, this logic necessarily abandons the pragmatic modesty 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14 One of four instances in which R2P can be invoked, with war crimes, genocide and ethnic 
cleansing (UN, 2005) 
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once associated with humanitarianism as well as the lengthy deliberations that 
human rights advocates have championed as the basis for establishing criminal 
accountability” (2007: 229) 
In this compelling passage, Leebaw presents R2P like a sort of failed hybrid, having tried 
to draw from both human rights and humanitarianism for legitimacy but ultimately 
consistent with neither.  
We have thus observed a shift from the semantics of ‘humanitarian intervention’ 
to ‘protection of civilians’. This move was principally orchestrated from within the 
United Nations, and supported by the work of the ICISS. The 1999 UNSG report on the 
protection of civilians constitutes one of the first re-articulations of the ‘humanitarian 
intervention’ concept without the ‘humanitarian intervention’ terminology. In that 
document, the UNSG recommends that “[i]n the face of massive and ongoing abuses”, 
the UNSC “consider the imposition of appropriate enforcement action” (UNSG, 1999: 
22). Antedating the ICISS report by two years, this document is symptomatic of the move 
toward a ‘protection of civilians’ framework characterised – in part – by the possible 
recourse to armed intervention, and thus paving the way for the R2P doctrine. However, 
much of the discussion on R2P was still “based on the ‘humanitarian’ framework” 
(Chandler, 2004; 62) and failed to address the nature and dynamics of the interaction 
between politico-military and humanitarian objectives. In the case of ‘humanitarian 
intervention’ as well as ‘protection of civilians’ the UN has assigned meanings to certain 
terms; meanings often at odds with their humanitarian –and arguably human rights– 
roots. This phenomenon has made these terms subject to political interpretation and 
linked them with military action. 
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Conclusions 
Coming back to Freud’s ‘narcissism of minor differences’ we can now see that 
though minor in the grand scheme of things, some of the differences between human 
rights and humanitarianism have brought about confusion, and tensions in the intersection 
of these two discourses and practices. As such, they cannot and should not be ignored. 
In this study, we have first presented a mapping of the convergence of human 
rights and humanitarianism. Looking at the evolving intersection between two bodies of 
law (IHRL and IHL) we saw some of the fundamental differences between them, such as 
their respective scopes of application (spatial as well as temporal), their respective 
constituencies, and the degrees of protection they provide in particular circumstances 
(derogability, nature of conflict). We then presented some of the efforts to make these 
differences less fundamental, looking notably at attempts to make human rights more 
justiciable, the ‘human-rightsisation’ of IHL through the evolution of customary law, and 
the extraterritorial application of IHRL.  
Turning to the associated discourses of human rights and humanitarianism as 
performed by four international organisations we have explored other manifestations of 
that growing convergence. Most significantly, we saw how Human Rights Watch and 
Amnesty International’s gradual adoption of humanitarian principles and lenses of 
analysis in their reporting has contributed to broadening their scope of activity, notably 
by including non-state actors. Such reporting has also participated in diminishing the 
differences between protection afforded in peacetime and wartime. Yet, this phenomenon 
has posed some fundamental challenges to the human rights ethos. By favouring 
humanitarian frames of analysis, these organisations have compromised on some crucial 
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aspects of human rights. By buying into the civilian/combatant dichotomy, they 
implicitly defy their universality; by adopting the ‘moral equivalence’ clause and 
focusing on jus in bello aspects, they narrow the aspirations of human rights and appear 
to settle for a minimal interpretation of that ambitious framework.  
Conversely, we have looked at MSF and ICRC’s relative resistance to rights 
discourse, in part through the predicament of maintaining access. MSF’s relationship to 
human rights and speaking out in their defence can be compared to the movement of a 
pendulum. Rather opposed to it at its genesis, it embraced it enthusiastically in the 1980s 
and 1990s, before retracting from it again in more recent years. More consistent in its 
reticence to such discourse, the ICRC has nonetheless shown –some– inflections. We can 
note for example, that in its most recent strategy document the ICRC recognised human 
rights law as a “major framework of reference in assessing the legality of the conduct of 
parties to armed conflict and other situations of violence” (ICRC, 2014a: 8).  We can thus 
see that rather than adopting a human rights lens to analyse ‘traditional’ humanitarian 
situations, these organisations use human rights frameworks in order to branch out, to 
touch on issues usually construed as outside their reach, broadening their protective 
range. We must continue to watch this as it develops.  As human rights and humanitarian 
scopes of activity increasingly overlap, existing tensions will inexorably be exacerbated.  
How will this convergence impact the future developments of human rights or 
humanitarianism? Moyn has famously argued that human rights as we know them only 
really crystallised “in the moral consciousness of people” in the 1970s, making them 
much younger than is usually thought (Moyn, 2014: 57). Qualifying them of ‘Last 
Utopia’, he conceives of human rights as the latest form of idealism, stepping in as other 
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inspiring utopias failed (Moyn, 2010). As such, human rights can be construed as “the 
spirit of the age” (Inge as cited in Slim, 2001: 26), a spirit that –some argue– is on the 
decline (Hopgood, 2013). These arguments bring up important questions regarding 
human rights’ convergence with humanitarianism: will human rights’ influence on 
humanitarianism recede? Will the convergence lend it the tools for resilience? Or will the 
language of human rights dissolve into other legal and moral discourses that will continue 
to bear its traces? 
 
 In its last section, the present study focused on the concept of ‘protection’, 
approaching it like a keyword that unlocks new understandings of the convergence, as 
one of its constitutive terms. We identified a clear surge of its use in both humanitarian 
and human rights discourses from the 1990s onwards, a timeline that corresponds to most 
accounts of their convergence. We studied the evolution of that terminology as it 
incorporated human rights and humanitarian elements, epitomising the intersection of 
these discourses in the UN setting and beyond. We looked at the successive initiatives to 
disambiguate that contested term, identifying the lead role of the ICRC. ‘Protection’ was 
also analysed as a vector through which rights-speak has penetrated humanitarian 
discourse and practice, exposing the pervasive potential of human rights discourse. In 
fact, the discussions around protection have participated to the rapprochement at the 
centre of this analysis. If we were to think of human rights and humanitarianism as the 
two circles of a Venn diagram, 'protection' would be somewhere in the intersection of the 
two circles. But beyond its mere existence in that intersection, I would argue that it could 
be seen exerting a form of traction, of magnetism, bringing the circles to further overlap. 
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Thinking of the intersection through the evolution of the ‘protection’ terminology, 
also lays bare some of the remaining tensions between human rights and 
humanitarianism. Following Chandler’s argument (2001) we have explored how the 
‘Responsibility to Protect’ doctrine, and its legitimisation of military intervention – as 
seen in the Libyan case – incarnates some of the inconsistencies of the rights-based 
humanitarian logic, stemming from the ‘politicisation’ of humanitarianism. Notably, it 
has allowed for the collapsing of jus in bello and jus ad bellum considerations into each 
other. 
Human rights and humanitarian organisations have looked to each other for ways 
to better address certain situations, they have borrowed each other’s language, and at 
times practices. By doing so they have furthered the converge between two concepts, two 
strands of the humanist vision, and laid bare some the challenges this overlap brings 
about. In its 1993 document regarding non-state actors, Amnesty International described 
international humanitarian law as the framework through which human rights are 
protected in war (AI, 1993). This statement is not wrong per se but it is symptomatic of 
some of the shortcomings of an uncritical convergence in which IHL comes to simply 
substitute human rights even in the work of human rights organisations. For human rights 
and humanitarianism are different projects, with similar objectives but ultimately distinct 
aspirations 
Throughout this project, I have attempted to read together numerous scholarly 
works on the intersections of human rights and humanitarianism, weighing claims against 
each other in an effort to make sense of that convergence. By having done that, I do not 
claim to have resolved the tensions it has created. But perhaps, as Raymond Williams 
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taught us, studying an issue by focusing on the language we use to discuss it can give us 
“just that extra edge of consciousness” that helps us understand it as “a shaping and 
reshaping, in real circumstances and from profoundly different and important points of 
view” (Williams, 1985: 24-5). For language is never a mere reflection of already 
constituted processes, it constitutes them, actively participating in their shaping and 
reshaping. Social and historical changes also “occur within language, in ways which 
indicate how integral the problems of meanings and of relationships really are” (Ibid: 22). 
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Number of mentions / 
number of pages Average over 5 years 
1990 56 124 0.452 
 1991 94 172 0.546 
 1992 56 220 0.254 
 1993 131 304 0.431 
 1994 153 328 0.466 0.430 (1990-1994) 
1995 141 352 0.401 
 1996 130 356 0.365 
 1997 132 380 0.347 
 1998 119 420 0.283 
 1999 149 460 0.324 0.344 (1995-1999) 
2000 175 312 0.561 
 2001 232 480 0.483 
 2002 229 433 0.529 
 2003 234 366 0.639 
 2004 266 382 0.696 0.582 (2000-2004) 
2005 271 412 0.658 
 2006 299 444 0.673 
 2007 287 467 0.615 
 2008 297 476 0.624 
 2009 311 496 0.627 0.639 (2005-2009) 
2010 395 584 0.676 
 2011 414 516 0.802 
 2012 549 564 0.973 
 2013 681 624 1.091 
 2014 741 622 1.191 0.947 (2010-2014) 
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Number of mentions/ 
number of pages Average over 5 years 
1990 55 308 0.179 
 1991 67 300 0.223 
 1992 73 322 0.227 
 1993 88 368 0.239 
 1994 88 367 0.240 0.221 (1990-1994) 
1995 99 368 0.269 
 1996 81 372 0.218 
 1997 108 391 0.276 
 1998 105 409 0.257 
 1999 130 417 0.312 0.266 (1995-1999) 
2000 145 303 0.478 
 2001 104 311 0.334 
 2002 125 316 0.396 
 2003 129 320 0.403 
 2004 160 347 0.461 0.414 (2000-2004) 
2005 158 324 0.488 
 2006 180 322 0.559 
 2007 118 246 0.480 
 2008 162 398 0.407 
 2009 173 424 0.408 0.468 (2005-2009 
2010 166 429 0.387 
 2011 172 432 0.398 
 2012 137 444 0.309 
 2013 121 328 0.369 
 2014/15 149 423 0.352 0.363 (2010-2014/15) 
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Appendix 3. 
IHL provisions and principles in Amnesty International’s reports on the 



















Title, and number of pages Mention of IHL provisions Mentions of IHL principles/terminology 
 Respecting International 
Humanitarian Law  - Iraq 
(2003a) (19 pages) 
‘humantarian law’ x21;  
‘IHL’ x3;  
Article 1 of GCs;  
Articles 4,5,13,14 of GCIII;  
Articles 48; 50(3); 51(4)(5)(6)(7); 52(1)(2)(3); 
53(c); 54(2)(4); 55(2); 56(4); 57(2) 51; 55; 52; 
53; 54; 75; 90; 90(2)(a)(d) of API 
‘civilian’ x117; 
‘combatant’ x8; 
‘indiscriminate' x19;  
'disproportionate' x6;  
'precaution' x9; 'disctinction'/'distinguish' 
x11. 
 Civilians Under Fire - Iraq 
(2003b) (7 pages) 
‘international humanitarian law' x 14;  
Articles 51(7); 50(3) of AP1 
‘civilian’ x78; 
‘combatant’ x3; 
‘indiscriminate x5;  
'disproportionate' x2; 
'distinguish/distinctive/distinction' x5;  
'precaution' x1 
 
 Responsibilities of the occupying 
powers - Iraq (2003c) (15 pages) 
‘IHL’ x 14  
'Fourth GC' x21;  
Prootcol I x4;  
Articles 1 of GCs;  
Articles 27, 46, 7, 49, 55, 56, 59, 60, 64, 64(2), 
65, 66, 67, 68, 69, 70, 71, 72, 73, 74, 75, 76, 
78 of GCIV; 
Article 75 of AP1;  
Articles 42, 43 of the Hague regulations;  
‘civilian’ x11; 
‘distinction’ x1; 
‘principles of necessity and 
proportionality’ x1 
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Appendix 4. 
IHL provisions and principles in Human Rights Watch’s reports on the 
2003 Gulf War 
Title, and number of pages Mentions of IHL provisions Mentions of IHL principles and terminology 
Human Rights Watch Briefing 
Paper: International 
Humanitarian Law Issues In A 
Potential War In Iraq - Iraq 
(2003a) (14 pages) 
‘IHL’/‘international humanitarian law’ 
x 33; 
Articles 2, 4, 13, of GCIII 
Articles 15, 17, 33, 34, 42, 43, 64, 71, 
72, 73 147, of GCIV 
Articles 20, 35, 48, 51, 52, 54, 55, 57, 




‘(in)discriminate’ ‘(in)discriminately x8 
‘precaution’ x2 
‘distinction’ x5 
‘proportionality’ / ‘(dis)proportionate’ /  
‘(dis)proportionally’ x5 
‘all parties to the conflict’ / ‘warring parties’ x13 
 Basra: Crime And Insecurity 
Under British Occupation - Iraq 
(2003b) (26 pages) 
‘international humanitarian law’ x1 ; 
‘laws of war’ x1 
Articles 6, 27, 55, 56, 63-77 of GCIV 
 
‘civilian’ x30 
‘proportionality’ / ‘(dis)proportionate’ /  
‘(dis)proportionally’ x1 
 
Violent Response: The U.S. Army 
In Al-Falluja - Iraq (2003c) (31 
pages) 
‘international humanitarian law’ x 7; 
Mentions U.S. Army regulations 
manual articles 
‘civilian’ x12 
‘(in)discriminate’ ‘(in)discriminately x4 
 ‘proportionality’ / ‘(dis)proportionate’ /  
‘(dis)proportionally’ x6 
 
 Off Target The Conduct Of The 
War And Civilian Casualties In 
Iraq - Iraq (2003d) (157 pages) 
‘IHL’ / ‘international humanitarian 
law’ x 53; ‘laws of war’ x2  
Articles 18, 19 of GCIV 
Articles 12, 13, 35, 38, 48, 51, 52, 53, 
54, 55, 57, 58, 59, 60, 70 of API 




‘(in)discriminate’ ‘(in)discriminately x24 
‘precaution’ x34 
‘distinction’ x17 
‘proportionality’ / ‘(dis)proportionate’ /  
‘(dis)proportionally’ x16 
‘all parties to the conflict’ / ‘warring parties’ x18 
 Hearts and Minds: Post-war 
Civilian Deaths in Baghdad 
Caused by U.S. Forces - Iraq 
(2003e) (72 pages) 
‘IHL’ / ‘international humanitarian 
law’ x 13; ‘laws of war’ x1 
Mentions ‘Fourth Geneva Convention’ 
but no specific articles 




‘(in)discriminate’ ‘(in)discriminately x13 
 ‘distinction’ x4 
‘proportionality’ / ‘(dis)proportionate’ /  
‘(dis)proportionally’ x13 
